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SUMMARY 
This thesis explores the potential civil liability of Credit Rating Agencies towards 
investors in the European Union and more especially in France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom. The recent provision Article 35a of the EU Regulation on CRAs facilitating CRAs’ 
liability towards investors has to be added to the legal bases existing under the law of these 
Member States. Fruitful comparative conclusions can be drawn from this analysis, inspiring 
judges of these Member States on issues specific to civil liability claims against CRAs such 
as the limits and characteristics of the class of claimants; the foreseeability of the use of 
ratings by investors and of their damage in case of incorrect rating; or, the degree of care 
required of CRAs because of their status as gatekeepers. The main conclusion is, nonetheless, 
that the area is clouded by legal uncertainty, with no decided cases on this specific matter in 
any of the Member States examined. To overcome the current legal uncertainty in Member 
States’ approaches to the issue, pertaining to the scope of civil liability, I advance certain 
proposals aimed at maintaining legal responsibility within reasonable limits in the final 
chapter of this thesis.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The financial crisis of 2008 shocked the world. No one expected such a major crisis in 
advance. The Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) in their role as gatekeepers were supposed to 
warn financial markets of the risk of default of certain securities; however, they were as taken 
by surprise as everyone else and were therefore criticized for their failure to anticipate the 
crisis and warn financial actors. The ongoing sovereign debt crisis in the European Union did 
not help to restore the reputation of CRAs. 
Indeed, since their birth at the turn of the 20
th
 century the core and primary function of 
CRAs has been to provide information.
1
 This role is considered a valuable one, as without 
this information on investments, investors from the general public would be at a disadvantage 
on financial markets in comparison to banks and other investors.
2
 In this context, credit 
ratings have been developed to reduce information asymmetries on financial markets.
3
 
The oligopolistic structure of the ratings market amplified the impact of their failure. The 
ratings market is dominated by three agencies, all of which are based in the US: Moody’s, 
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch4. Together, these three CRAs account for 95% of the worldwide 
rating market.
5
 The remaining 5% is held by small CRAs acting in specific geographic areas 
(such as the Domination Bond Rating Service in Canada).
6
 The role of CRAs was, therefore, 
placed under the spotlight by the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt 
crisis. 
                                                 
1
 For further information on the history of the rating industry: Bruno Quentin, 'Les Agences De Notation', Revue 
de Droit bancaire et financier, 2004/6, at p. 1; Fabienne Collard, 'Au Coeur Des Agences De Notation', Les 
analyses du CRISP en ligne, (2011), at p. 4 & 8; Richard Levich, e.a., Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global 
Financial System (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), at p. 19 & 24; Kim Oosterlinck, 'Rôle Et 
Nécessité Des Agences De Notation : Une Perspective Historique', Les Agences De Notation Financière. Entre 
Marchés Et Etats (Bruxelles: Larcier, 2013), at pp. 17-24. 
2
 Reinhart, op. cit., at p. 43. 
3
 Uwe Blaurock, 'Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies', Electronic Journal of Comparative 
Law, 11.3 (2007), at p. 6. For this reason, credit ratings were integrated in US regulations in the 1930s: 
Reinhart, op. cit., at p. 34. 
4
 Reinhart, op. cit., at p. 44. Fitch is a rating agency owned partially by a French company: Herwig Langhor, 
Patricia Langohr, The Rating Agencies and Their Credit Ratings: What They Are, How They Work and Why 
They Are Relevant (Chichester: Wiley, 2008), at p. 399; Ra uel  arc a Alcubilla, Javier Ruiz Del Pozo, Credit 
Rating Agencies on the Watch List : Analysis of European Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
at p. 9. 
5
 Autorité Des Marchés Financiers, 'Les Agences De Notations : Comprendre Et Utiliser Leurs Notes De Crédit', 
(2013), at p. 3; Collard, op. cit., at p. 9. 
6
 Collard, op. cit., at p. 9. However, according to certain sources, no less than 130 CRAs would exist on earth: 
ibid., at p. 7; Mikael Petitjean, 'De L'(in)Utilité Des Agences De Notation', Problèmes économiques, 3057 
(2012), at p. 57; Aymeri de Montesquiou, 'Rapport D'information : Les Agences De Notation: Pour Une 
Profession Réglementée', (598 (2011-2012): Sénat français, 2012), at p. 11. 
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Both the 2008 financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis have drawn the public attention to 
the power of CRAs. This power was rightly underlined by Thomas Friedman in 1996 when 
he said that “[t]here are two superpowers in the world today ... the United States and ... 
Moody’s Bond Rating Service. The United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and 
Moody’s can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it’s not clear 
sometimes who’s more powerful.”7 The 2008 financial crisis together with the sovereign debt 
crisis revealed how important it was to provide a framework for the exercise of such power. 
Indeed, these crises highlighted the existence of issues in the way rating activity was 
conducted by the Agencies:
8
 the problem of independence and the possibility of conflicts of 
interest; the method they use; and their liability. In response to the problems highlighted by 
the crises, both US and EU legislators started adopting rules to discipline their behaviour. 
More specifically, the civil liability of CRAs began to be discussed in the aftermath of the 
crises. Before then, CRAs faced few lawsuits and the few they did face they almost always 
won; after the crisis, the number of lawsuits rose.
9
 Claimants faced hurdles when seeking 
CRAs’ civil liability. Lawmakers started reflecting on these obstacles. The EU Regulation on 
CRAs of 2009 was amended in May 2013 to introduce a specific provision for the civil 
liability of CRAs. The impact of this new provision must be evaluated as it does not create an 
autonomous liability regime for CRAs, but rather establishes rules that need to be combined 
with national legislation.  
Civil liability is important for two reasons: first, it compensates damaged parties; second, 
it constitutes an incentive for CRAs to comply with their legal obligations. The presence of 
the threat of being held liable by courts also influences competition on the market – which, in 
the present case, is particularly oligopolistic.
10
 
In this dissertation I will analyse the civil liability of CRAs in three Member States of the 
European Union: Germany, France and the United Kingdom. I will focus especially on civil 
liability towards investors. My aim is to ascertain whether CRAs’ civil liability can be 
engaged and what improvements can be made to render it more effective. To this end, having 
first presented the general context in which CRAs evolved and currently move, I will assess 
how investors may bring civil liability lawsuits against CRAs. First, I establish an exemplary 
fact-pattern that I will use as the factual basis of this thesis, in which the relationship to be 
                                                 
7
 http://www.pbs.org/newshour/gergen/friedman.html (last accessed on 21/01/2014). 
8
 Alessandro Scarso, 'The Liability of Credit Rating Agencies in a Comparative Perspective', Journal of 
European Tort Law, 4/2 (2013), at p. 164. 
9
 de Montesquiou, op. cit., at pp. 155-58. 
10
 Aline Darbellay, Regulating Credit Rating Agencies (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013), at p. 76.  
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studied is explained as well as what might be considered as an “inaccurate” rating. I then 
determine the legal bases that fit this fact pattern in the EU, France, Germany and the UK, 
and emphasise the similarities and differences between them. The third chapter of the thesis 
is dedicated to the requirements of liability that were found it the legal bases detailed in the 
second part. At that juncture, the analysis is no longer divided by legal system but by 
requirement, through an integrated comparative analysis of the requirements in each legal 
system. At the end of the third chapter, I explore the possible limits of liability in terms of 
damages or constitutional obstacles such as Freedom of Speech. Finally, I draw the final 
conclusions in the fourth chapter dedicated to the overall assessment which also provides 
thoughts for improving CRAs’ civil liability. 
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CHAPTER I : GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE RATING ENVIRONMENT 
This first chapter depicts the general context in which CRAs act and demonstrates why 
the study of their civil liability is of great importance. Before looking in detail at the specific 
rules applied to CRAs regarding their civil liability, several issues must be addressed to frame 
the general context in which this liability will be interpreted: first, the main definitions of the 
research; second, the evolution of the legislative control of CRAs and the reliance on credit 
ratings. 
I. Ratings and Rating Agencies 
The concepts of credit ratings and Credit Rating Agencies can be defined in several ways. 
By examining their different characteristics we can establish the framework of our research 
and the relevant features of each concept. The definitions of ratings and rating agencies 
indeed frame the way the civil liability regime is to be understood because they create the 
basis for the determination of an inaccurate rating, which will be defined in Chapter II. 
Credit Ratings 
A credit rating can be defined as an assessment of the creditworthiness of a borrower and 
in consequence of his debt default risk. In addition, it can also be an assessment of the 
creditworthiness of various financial instruments. As my research focuses on the civil 
liability of CRAs in the European Union, the definition of a credit rating established by the 
European Regulation of 2009 should also be taken into account. A credit rating is defined in 
this Regulation as “an opinion regarding the creditworthiness of an entity, a debt or financial 
obligation, debt security, preferred share or other financial instrument, or of an issuer of such 
a debt or financial obligation, debt security, preferred share or other financial instrument, 
issued using an established and defined ranking system of rating categories”.11 This definition 
is a broad one, encompassing the considerable diversity of the subject matter of credit ratings. 
Stated more precisely, the assessed products can be structured financial products, debts, 
bonds, or sovereign debt.
12
 Moreover, CRAs themselves define their ratings as opinions and 
                                                 
11
 Regulation (EC) 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on Credit 
Rating Agencies, O.J.E.U., 17 November 2009, L 302/1, Article 3(1) a). 
12
 Jan Oster, 'Who Rates the Raters ? The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in the Eu', MJ, 17/4 (2010), at 
p. 355. 
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they insist that these opinions do not constitute recommendations to invest.
13
 We will 
examine the relevance of the definition of credit ratings as opinions when the concept of 
inaccurate rating will be analysed.
14
 
As this study comprises a comparative analysis of three Member States, the common 
point of reference is the definition established by the EU Regulation. It should also be noted 
that credit ratings are the result of rating processes developed by each CRA – these rating 
processes being recognised as trade secrets.
15
 Moreover, the results are usually expressed in 
letter rankings – this is what the EU definition refers to with regard to “issued using an 
established and defined ranking system of rating categories”.16 The letters’ format, however, 
differs from CRA to CRA: for instance, Moody’s uses ratings from Aaa to C17; while 
Standard & Poor’s18 and Fitch19 use AAA to D. The method and, in particular, the specificity 
of the rating process are significant features for the definition of the scope of CRAs’ liability. 
Finally, several distinctions exist between ratings. First, ratings can be internal or 
external, which means that the issuer can produce internally its own ratings or decide to 
externalise this activity and delegate it to a CRA.
20
 A second important distinction is the one 
between solicited and unsolicited ratings. The first are issued by a CRA on the basis of a 
client request
21
 – in other words, on the basis of a contractual relationship between the two.22 
By contrast, unsolicited ratings are based only on public data and are not rooted in a 
contractual relationship between the CRA and the issuer.
23
 They are issued, therefore, on the 
agency’s own initiative.24 This distinction is of particular importance for the basis used in 
liability claims as, under certain laws, contracts can protect the investors.
25
  
                                                 
13
 Andreas Kruck, Private Ratings, Public Regulations. Credit Rating Agencies and Global Financial 
Governance (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan), 2011, at p. 20; it is clearly expressed on S&P website: 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/aboutcreditratings/ ‘What Credit Ratings Are & Are Not’ (last accessed on 
08/01/2014). 
14
 See Chapter II. 
15
 De Montesquiou, op. cit., at p. 11; Collard, op. cit., at p. 7 and p. 18.  
16
 Kruck, op. cit., at p. 20. 
17
 https://www.moodys.com/Pages/amr002002.aspx?lang=fr&cy=fra (last accessed on 08/01/2014). 
18
 http://www.standardandpoors.com/aboutcreditratings/ ‘The ABCs of Rating Scales’, (last accessed on 
08/01/2014). 
19
 https://www.fitchratings.com/web/en/dynamic/about-us/about-us.jsp (last accessed on 08/01/2014). 
20
 Blaurock, op. cit., at p. 2. 
21
 Thierry Bonneau, 'Coup De Projecteur Sur Les Agences De Notation', La Semaine Juridique Edition 
Générale, 45 (2011), p. 1968 – 69, at p. 1968. 
22
 Blaurock, op. cit., at pp. 3-4. 
23
 Yves Chaput, 'Contrôle Et Responsablité De La Notation Financière : Les Agences De Rating En Droit 
Français', Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé, 2006/2, pp. 493 – 502, at p. 498. 
24
 Blaurock, op. cit., at p. 4. 
25
 See Chapter II. Gerhard Wildmoser; Jan Schiffer; Bernd Langoth, 'Haftung Von Ratingagenturen Gegenüber 
Anlegern?', Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft, 10 (2009), at p. 664. 
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A third distinction is that the ratings can be free or regulated. Free ratings are not subject 
to any regulation, whereas, regulated ratings must correspond to regulatory requirements. For 
instance, credit ratings issued in the EU must be issued by a registered CRA within the EU.
26
 
The fourth distinction is the delimitation between investment grades and speculative grades.
27
 
Investment grades are grades given to “issuers and issues with relatively higher levels of 
creditworthiness and credit  uality.”28 Speculative grades, on the other hand, indicate that 
“the issue or issuer [that] currently has the ability to repay but faces uncertainties, such as 
adverse business or financial circumstances, which could increase the likelihood of default, 
or failure to meet its financial obligations in accordance with the terms of those 
obligations.”29 This last distinction is important for the use of ratings in certain legislation. 
Indeed, references to ratings and the distinction between investment and speculative grades 
can be found, for instance, in bank supervisory laws and in securities and insurance laws.
30
 
These last two distinctions help us understand the kind of ratings on which investors based 
their decisions and will be addressed separately in the subsequent chapters. 
  
                                                 
26
 Bonneau, op. cit., at p. 1968. 
27
 Edith Weemaels, 'Les Agences De Notation En Europe : Contrôle, Responsabilité Et Légitimité', Les Agences 
De Notation Financière. Entre Marchés Et Etats (Bruxelles: Larcier, 2013), at p. 66. 
28
 http://www.standardandpoors.com/aboutcreditratings/ ‘The ABCs of Rating Scales’, (last accessed on 
08/01/2014). In the ratings of the three big agencies, investment grades are between AAA and BBB- for S&P 
and Fitch and Aaa to Baa for Moody’s: see respectively, http://www.standardandpoors.com/aboutcreditratings/ 
‘Opinions Reflected by S&P’s Ratings’ (last accessed on 08/01/2014); Autorité des marchés financiers, 'Les 
Agences De Notations : Comprendre Et Utiliser Leurs Notes De Crédit', at p. 4; 
https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_79004 at p. 5 (last accessed on 
08/01/2014). 
29
 http://www.standardandpoors.com/aboutcreditratings/ ‘The ABCs of Rating Scales’, (last accessed on 
08/01/2014). The speculative grades are therefore the lowest grades: from BB+ to D for S&P and Fitch and 
from Ba to C for Moody’s. See respectively: http://www.standardandpoors.com/aboutcreditratings/ ‘Opinions 
Reflected by S&P’s Ratings’ (last accessed on 08/01/2014); ibid. 
https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_79004 at p. 5 (last accessed on 
08/01/2014). 
30
 Eddy Wymeersch; Marc Kruithof, 'Regulation and Liability of Credit Rating Agencies under Belgian Law', 
Financial Law Institute - Working Paper Series, 2006-05 (2006), at p. 368; Blaurock, op. cit., at p. 9. 
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Credit Rating Agencies 
Credit Ratings Agencies can be defined on the basis of their activities and the functions 
they fulfil. They should also be seen as part of a market presenting specific attributes as both 
definitions influence the way CRAs are viewed by market actors, in political debate and by 
the public. These perspectives give an understanding of the functioning of these agencies 
whose liability is in issue. Such an understanding is important for the purposes of our 
research as their functioning has, in fact, a direct impact on their civil liability.
31
 
A Credit Rating Agency is defined in the EU as “a legal person whose occupation 
includes the issuing of credit ratings on a professional basis”32. The definition refers to the 
rating activity of CRAs. As noted above, the rating activity is the main and first activity of 
CRAs. In the context of the present research, I will use the EU definition as we will focus 
solely on the CRAs’ civil liability on the basis of their rating activity.  
Other activities are, nevertheless, performed by CRAs. Indeed, the selling of studies, data 
and statistical information constitute an auxiliary activity of CRAs.
33
 Moreover, as structured 
products have been developed, CRAs have moved to advisory activities for the creation of 
these products.
34
 This means that CRAs may evaluate a product that they helped create
35
, 
placing them in a conflict of interest.
36
 The other kind of conflict of interest in which CRAs 
can be placed with issuers comes from the way CRAs are paid: at the beginning of the rating 
industry, investors paid the CRAs to obtain ratings on the creditworthiness of an issuer; since 
the beginning of 1970s, the model has changed
37
 and the issuers now pay for the ratings.
38
 
This new model is referred to as the ‘issuer-pays’ model.39 Thus, both multiple activities with 
issuers rated and the ‘issuer-pays’ model lead to conflicts of interest. These key features can, 
to a certain extent, influence the CRAs’ civil liability.40 
                                                 
31
 See infra, for instance, the description of the conflicts of interest. 
32
 Regulation (EC) 1060/2009, supra, Article 3(1)b. 
33
 Collard, op. cit., at p. 4; Mireille Bardos, 'Les Grandes Agences De Notation Internationales: Leur Rôle 
Annoncé Dans La Crise, Vers Quelle Régulation ?', Les Cahiers Lasaire, 2009/38, at p. 9. 
34
 Collard, op. cit., at p. 4. 
35
 Blaurock, op. cit., at p. 31. 
36
 The technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions ‘Report on the 
activities of Credit Rating Agencies’ (2003) p. 11 http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD153.pdf. 
37
 This change of model is commonly attributed to the free-rider risks that appeared with the invention of the 
photocopiers: Oster, op. cit., at p. 361. 
38
 De Montesquiou, op. cit., at p. 16.  
39
 Weemaels, op. cit., at p. 68. 
40
 See Chapter II. 
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The rating activity implies that CRAs have three functions: to inform, license and 
advertise.
41
 As noted earlier, their first function is to reduce the information asymmetry 
between investors and issuers.
42
 This function is important to lower transaction costs in 
financial relations.
43
 Second, CRAs are empowered by regulations to act as gatekeepers for 
banking and insurance sectors, as well as for institutional investors. Their last role consists of 
an advertising function: credit ratings can be used as advertising by the issuer as they assess 
their trustworthiness.
44
 The carrying on of these functions gives CRAs an unavoidable and 
powerful position in financial markets.  
The last remark concerning the activities of CRAs is that their profession should be 
distinguished from others such as financial analysts.
45
 The recent EU Regulation of 2013 
clearly makes this distinction in its preamble: “Credit Rating Agencies are not mere financial 
analysts or investment advisors.”46 This distinction is important with regard to the scope of 
certain legal instruments and will also determine whether certain parallels can be drawn with 
the civil liability regime applicable to other professions. 
The definition and description of credit ratings as well as CRAs have therefore 
highlighted core elements that will either constitute the basis of a civil liability lawsuit 
against a rating agency or, on the contrary, place a limit on their liability.
47
 
II. Evolution of the extra-national rules applied to CRAs 
For a long time, CRAs were not subject to laws except those applicable to all businesses 
and legal persons. Certain rules have, however, been applied to them. In this context, CRAs 
developed standards by themselves (i). This dynamic changed again after the 2008 financial 
crisis: many laws were adopted in a very short period of time after the crisis (ii). This 
evolution not only shows the general legal context in which CRAs evolve but also 
emphasizes the legal regulatory wave that started after the crisis from self/internal-regulation 
to public/external regulation. This tendency should not be forgotten while assessing the 
recently developed liability rules.  
                                                 
41
 Oster, op. cit., at p. 356. 
42
 Piero Cinquegrana, 'The Reform of the Credit Rating Agencies: A Comparative Perspective', ECMI Policy 
Brief, 2009/12, at p. 2. 
43
 Oster, op. cit., at pp. 355-56; Aline Darbellay, Regulating Ratings. The Credit Rating Agency Oligopoly from 
a Regulatory Perspective, (Basel: Schulthess, 2011), at p. 4. 
44
 Oster, op. cit., at p. 356. 
45
 Chaput, op. cit., at p. 495. 
46
 Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013, amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies, O.J.E.U., 31 May 2013, L 146/1, preamble (8). 
47
 See Chapter II. 
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At first, no specific rules existed 
The first rule that was applied uniquely to CRAs is the obligation of being recognized as 
a “Nationally recognized statistical rating organization” (NRSRO) in order to issue ratings 
used for supervisory purposes in the United States.
48
 This rule adopted in 1975 by the SEC 
authorized it to give the NRSRO status to CRAs
49
; however, the criteria for the acquisition of 
this status were not clear.
50
 It was not until 2006 that a clear recognition procedure was 
adopted under the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act.
51
 Except for this American rule on 
recognition, no specific legal requirement was placed on CRAs in the 20
th
 century.
52
 
According to Pagliari, at that time, market discipline was the key to the “regulation” of 
CRAs.
53
 We can, in consequence, speak of a “self-regulation” of CRAs until recently.54  
In the absence of public rules, standards were adopted and CRAs themselves integrated 
those standards. First of all, the International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSC), 
an organisation that “brings together the world's securities regulators and is recognized as the 
global standard setter for the securities sector”55 adopted the IOSCO Code of Conduct for 
CRAs in 2004. This Code contains rules mainly protecting the quality of the rating process, 
the independence of CRAs and the avoidance of conflicts of interest, assuring their 
responsibility towards third parties and issuers of securities and finally the disclosure to the 
public of their code of conduct.
56
 The Code was reviewed after the crisis.
57
 In the EU, an 
annual review was performed by the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) 
to verify compliance with the Code of Conduct.
58
 However, the Code is not legally binding
59
 
and its incorporation within the CRAs is governed by the requirement to comply or explain
60
. 
                                                 
48
 Caroline Lequesne-Roth; Arnaud Van Waeyenberge, 'La Réglementation Européenne : De La Négligence À 
L'impuissance?', Les Agences De Notation Financière. Entre Marchés Et Etats (Bruxelles: Larcier, 2013), at p. 
115; Oster, op. cit., at p. 360. 
49
 Reinhart, op. cit., at p. 51. 
50
 Collard, op. cit., at p. 48. 
51
 Blaurock, op. cit., at p. 11. 
52
 Ibid., at p. 14. 
53
 Stefano Pagliari, 'Who Governs Finance? The Shifting Public-Private Divide in the Regulation of Derivatives, 
Rating Agencies and Hedge Funds', at p. 52. 
54
 Ibid., at p. 50 & 54. 
55
 ‘The International Organization of Securities Commissions’, http://www.iosco.org/about/ (last accessed on 
11/01/2014). 
56
 OICV-IOSCO, ‘Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies. A Consultation Report of the 
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In conjunction with the development of these standards, CRAs adopted internal reforms to 
show that the sector was self-regulating. Thus, the main CRAs implemented internal rules 
assuring more independence and a more transparent rating process.
61
 
Wave of legal rules 
The tendency to leave the sector out of legal regulation stricto sensu ended in 2006 in the 
US with the adoption of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act.
62
 This reform aimed to render 
the NRSRO recognition by the SEC more objective by introducing official and objective 
criteria.
63
 After this reform, five CRAs were recognized as NRSROs by the SEC, leading to a 
total of ten NRSROs.
64
 This act was the first legal act adopted before the large number of acts 
adopted in reaction of the 2008 financial crisis. 
This crisis highlighted the existence of problems in ratings such as the over-evaluation of 
several products
65
 and CRAs were blamed for these errors in ratings.
66
 The failure of the past 
model of CRAs’ regulation identified in the aftermath of the crisis pushed politicians to react 
by taking legal measures on both sides of the Atlantic.
67
 In the context of the general legal 
rules developed for CRAs and, more specifically, in the context of the civil liability rules for 
CRAs, the legal developments in the US were a step ahead of the EU interventions; we can 
therefore argue that they inspired both EU and European national legislators. Indeed, in 2010, 
the US Congress then adopted the Dodd-Frank Act,
68
 which reformed the financial system in 
the United States. Its main innovations are the reinforcement of the SEC’s powers69, the 
creation of civil liability rules for CRAs and the removal of any use of ratings for regulatory 
                                                 
61
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purposes.
70
 This last measure marks the first important step in the movement to reduce 
reliance on ratings, which is currently ongoing at the EU and the international level as well. 
With regard to civil liability, a new regime for the liability of NRSROs has been established
71
 
to counter the immunity that CRAs obtained under the protection of the First Amendment in 
the US.
72
 The new regime of liability allows investors to sue CRAs where they “knowingly 
or recklessly failed ... to conduct a reasonable investigation of the rated security ... or ... to 
obtain reasonable verification of such factual elements”73.  
In the EU, there were vigorous reactions against CRAs in the EU after the financial crisis 
which persisted during the ongoing sovereign debt crisis. In 2008, the European Commission 
considered that the self-regulatory scheme of CRAs was insufficient “to cope with the severe 
problems and restore the confidence in the markets”74.75 In turn, the EU adopted its first 
specific regulation of CRAs in 2009. This Regulation aimed to establish a direct oversight 
over CRAs in the EU. This control, which was performed by the CESR,
76
 took, for instance, 
the form of a registration of the CRA or a certification if the CRA had no subsidiary in the 
EU.
77
 Under this first Regulation, registrations and certifications were granted by national 
authorities and not directly by the CESR.
78 
In addition, this first Regulation contained rules 
relating to independence and prevention of conflicts of interest in the rating process.
79
  
The national competence changed in 2011 when the initial Regulation was modified for 
the first time. The Regulation of 2011
80
 reinforced the powers of the European supervision 
authorities by creating the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and by giving 
to this authority the competence for registrations and certifications as well as a power to 
investigate
81
 and a power to impose sanctions.
82
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The EU did not stop there, the initial Regulation was modified again in 2013 (here after 
“CRA3 Regulation”).83 Two main changes are worth mentioning. First, the CRA3 Regulation 
contains two articles reducing the reliance on ratings. On the one hand, the new Article 5a 
provides that investors should not rely solely on credit ratings for their investments and that 
they also should perform their own risk assessment of products.
84
 On the other hand, the new 
Article 5c copes with the “cliff effect” problem: when the credit rating of a product is 
downgraded, investors with investment guidelines may be obliged to sell the product; the 
cliff effect happens when there is a massive sale of this product, amplifying the consequences 
of the downgrade on the market.
85
 To pursue this aim, the Regulation empowers the 
Commission to assess the impact of references to ratings in legislation and to suppress all the 
references to ratings in the legislation by 2020.
86
 
Second, the CRA3 Regulation deals with the problems that issuers and/or investors face 
when they try to obtain civil liability of CRAs for their defective ratings.
87
 The new Article 
35a states that “[w]here a credit rating agency has committed, intentionally or with gross 
negligence, any of the infringements listed in Annex III having an impact on a credit rating, 
an investor or issuer may claim damages from that credit rating agency for damage caused to 
it due to that infringement.”88 Then, it introduces a common basis of action for issuers and 
investors. However, this basis does not cover all incorrect ratings
89
, but only those infringing 
Annex III. The second part of this thesis will focus on the scope and consequences of this 
provision. 
In conclusion, a number of legal reforms took place after the 2008 financial crisis. Whilst 
they were self-regulated in the beginning, CRAs are now the object of public rules. In both 
the US and the EU legislators reflected on how to increase the scope of CRAs’ civil liability 
in the aftermath of the crisis and  started adopting rules to this end. These developments 
demonstrate how important the question is, but also that in the EU the civil liability provision 
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is clearly conceived as a way to ensure the correct application of the obligations stated in the 
Regulation and its Annexes. CRAs’ civil liability is, consequently, more strictly framed now 
in both the US and in the EU. 
I would add a word specifically on the reliance on ratings. Whereas it is clear that US and 
EU legislators try to reduce reliance on ratings by reducing references to ratings in 
legislation, next to this latter phenomenon that we can call “legal reliance”, factual reliance 
on ratings exist on financial markets. The use of credit ratings in financial market transactions 
on the basis of the investors and issuers’ own initiative created an additional movement of 
reliance on credit ratings. This phenomenon has been recognised by the European 
legislator.
90
 The use of ratings by financial actors allowed them to become “factual entry 
re uirement” to markets in Europe for instance.91 Indeed, as CRAs constitute the 
informational link between borrowers and lenders on financial markets, the increasing 
complexity of finance (its globalization, the new financial products, the number of actors) 
gave CRAs a central role to play in financial relationships. This complexity led therefore to 
an increase in the use of ratings and made them unavoidable in certain situations.
92
  
An example of factual reliance is the contractual reference to credit ratings. There can be 
contracts between private investors and their investor managers where a minimum rating is 
set for the decision to invest.
93
 There can also be contracts between a lender and a borrower 
including, for instance, “rating triggers” which are clauses organizing specific contractual 
consequences, such as the termination of the contract,
94
 in case of a downgrade of the 
borrowers.
95
  
The two aspects of reliance, legal and factual, have led to a so-called “over-reliance” on 
credit ratings
96
 identified by certain authors as one of the origins of the 2008 financial 
crisis,
97
 the reason why EU and US legislators attempt to reduce it. This tendency to reduce 
the regulatory references to credit ratings must, however, be tempered. First, uncertainty 
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exists as for the availability of alternatives.
98
 Second, difficulties already arose when US 
authorities tried to implement the reduction of references to ratings.
99
 And third, factual 
reliance on ratings continued after the crisis.
100
 These three elements
101
 allow us to see a 
continuation in the use of credit ratings by financial actors, especially by investors. 
Consequently, the application of civil liability rules to CRAs remains an important safeguard 
of ex post investor protection. 
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Conclusion 
Credit Ratings Agencies have obtained significant power to shape financial markets over 
the years. The recent crisis brought into relief the necessity of legal intervention, especially to 
create a civil liability framework. Because of the trust financial actors have in CRAs and 
because of the issues highlighted by the crisis, the study of CRA civil liability is of great 
relevance. In short, the judgments of rating agencies are not infallible. However, not every 
rating can serve as a basis for a civil liability lawsuit, this is why the concepts defined above 
will allow us to determine what should be understood as an inaccurate rating, possibly 
constituting a basis for a successful lawsuit. In this respect, the way the conflicts of interest 
above-described can be relied upon as the basis of a civil liability claim requires clarification. 
In this context, the supranational instruments analysed constitute the general framework 
in which national laws are to be interpreted. This research constitutes a comparative law 
analysis. Even though the last EU Regulation on CRAs establishes rules for their civil 
liability, it does not create an independent and new kind of liability action. The established 
basis of liability needs to be enshrined in national law. The preamble of the CRA3 Regulation 
states clearly: “[r]egarding matters concerning the civil liability of a credit rating agency 
which are not covered by or defined in this Regulation, including causation and the concept 
of gross negligence, such matters should be governed by the applicable national law”.102  
The EU Member States examined – France, Germany and the United Kingdom – have 
been selected because of the differences in their legal approaches and systems. While 
France
103
 and the UK adopted specific rules for the civil liability of CRAs; Germany did not, 
but instead decided to leave its system as it was.
104
 Moreover, Germany is the only Member 
State to have developed specific legal instruments and arguments to cope with the issue of 
CRAs’ civil liability. This comparative perspective aims to give an overview of the three 
main tendencies and of the significant national doctrines framing the civil liability of rating 
agencies in the European Union. 
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CHAPTER II – HEADS OF LIABILITY 
Several questions arise when one thinks about the civil liability of Credit Rating 
Agencies: what are the limits of this liability, who can realistically sue CRAs, what are the 
rules to be applied? These are the questions I will answer in this chapter. These answers are 
essential to provide a framework in which both parties – claimant and defendant – can expect 
civil liability issues to be brought to courts. First, an exemplary fact pattern of the claim has 
to be established (I.). This encompasses the identity of the claimant, but also the 
characteristics of the rating that will be the basis of the claim. Second, this example of fact 
pattern will have to be confronted with national laws to assess whether they can serve as a 
cause of action for investors (II.).  
I. Potentially relevant fact patterns 
Facts – as obvious as this may seem – are important in lawsuits. They are important 
because the construction of a fact pattern, including the key elements of a potential lawsuit 
against a Credit Rating Agency, will guide us in the analysis of suitable legal bases for this 
particular kind of lawsuit. This description of a considered situation includes two factors: the 
claimant’s identity and the characteristics of the rating that can give rise to a lawsuit. 
A. The relationship to be studied 
An inaccurate rating can damage more than one category of actor: from issuers, including 
states, to investors. All these situations can possibly involve civil liability issues but are quite 
different as the relationships between these actors and the CRAs are not developed on the 
same grounds. While this thesis focuses solely on the relationship between CRAs and 
investors, an overview of the other situations is nevertheless useful to situate this relationship 
in a broader perspective. 
Investors and CRAs 
The category of investors in rated securities is a very broad group containing highly 
diverse actors. For the purposes of this study, I distinguish between investors who have 
access to substantial resources, and small investors drawn from the general public, who have 
little or no expertise in investment decisions.
105
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The relationship between CRAs and investors differs from that between CRAs and 
issuers in that the former often lacks contractual regulation. This relationship exists because 
investors rely on ratings issued by rating agencies as the basis of their investment 
decisions.
106
 In certain cases, however, ‘subscription’ contracts tie investors to CRAs for the 
provision of ratings on a regular basis; investors are then sometimes CRAs’ clients.107 Even if 
ratings are often publicly available on CRAs’ websites, it is possible to obtain more detailed 
ratings or information on the basis of these ‘subscription’ contracts.108 With the exception of 
this ‘subscription’ contracts, the general sphere of the investor-CRAs relationship is extra-
contractual.  
Another distinction can be drawn between investors. First, one might distinguish between 
investors who do not have any contact with CRAs, even indirectly, and investors who do 
interact with CRAs, albeit through an intermediary. In this last particular relationship, 
investors delegate to a third party – a bank for instance – the management of their wealth.109 
In this latter case, an extra-contractual liability issue in respect of CRAs may arise when the 
information obtained from the CRA by the intermediary was inaccurate, and in the absence of 
attribution to the intermediary for failure to pass on accurate information on to its clients.
110
  
In conclusion, three kinds of investor exist: those who are paying clients of a CRA 
(contractual relationship); those who obtain investment advice from a third party that has a 
relationship with a CRA (extra-contractual, third party effects); and those who rely on 
publicly available ratings (extra-contractual, general duty of care). The last two kinds of 
investors are the main focus of this thesis. The first category of investors falls outside the 
scope of this thesis and will not be studied here.  
I chose to study the extra-contractual liability of CRAs towards investors not only 
because it appears to be the most difficult to obtain in practice, but also because it is a crucial 
and current issue. The final aim of empowering investors to sue CRAs has a broader policy 
aim than that of simply providing them with compensation for their damage. Indeed, it is a 
way of punishing CRAs when they behave against their obligations towards third parties or 
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the care that can be required of them. It has, therefore, a utility as an ex post control 
mechanism. 
Issuers and CRAs 
The relationship between an issuer and a rating agency can be contractual (solicited 
rating) or non-contractual (unsolicited rating).
111
 Moreover, the rating’s object can be either a 
corporation or a financial product.
112
 The form of the latter varies from private placements to 
preferred stocks or structured financial products.
113 
These structured financial products have 
attracted particular attention since the financial crisis.
114
 
When the rating is unsolicited, potential liability can only be extra-contractual; but most 
of the time, the relationship is between investor and CRA is contractual. This contract can be 
defined in multiple ways: employment contract
115
; contrat innommé; and so on. The 
contractual character of their relationship renders it difficult to study in general, as 
contractual terms vary considerably. Parties are free to organize their own obligations. It is 
true that several common clauses are often exampled and appear to be problematic when 
issuers seek CRAs’ civil liability. Among them is the case of clauses which limit a CRA’s 
liability. I will not analyse these clauses in this thesis. It suffices to say that close attention 
has been paid in recent years to these contractual clauses leading, for instance, France to 
declare them unwritten and therefore of no legal effect.
116
 The success of a civil liability 
lawsuit brought by an issuer on the basis of an inaccurate rating will, therefore, depend on the 
content of their contractual agreement. 
States and CRAs 
Rating agencies started issuing ratings of public bodies in the early 20
th
 century. These 
ratings include ratings of States. Here, the task of an agency could be different since “the 
central issue in sovereign borrowing is not the ability to pay but rather the willingness to 
pay”.117 This ratings task, which does not seem easy, has not been spared criticisms. CRAs 
were indeed blamed for their role in the recent Euro-debt crisis and for their tendency to 
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‘condemn’ political regimes that did not correspond to their standards. The question of 
sovereign debt ratings was thus a crucial issue when the European legislator adopted the 
CRA3 Regulation. The timing of their disclosure is now more strictly regulated in order to 
avoid market volatility that may influence, directly or indirectly, the outcome of democratic 
elections.
 118
   
Most sovereign ratings are unsolicited but several states have contracts with a particular 
CRA.
119
 The basis of a possible lawsuit here is, in the main, extra-contractual. This 
relationship will not, however, be studied here – the narrow focus of this thesis is the liability 
of CRAs towards investors. 
B. The inaccuracy of a credit rating 
A rating is inaccurate when the prediction it makes about the creditworthiness of an issuer 
or about an issue rated is not confirmed by facts. In this respect, two problems can occur 
either when the rating is too positive, or when it is too negative.  
The last possibility does not concern investors but only issuers as it is in the issuers’ 
interest to obtain the highest possible rating. Obtaining too low a rating will therefore damage 
them – as the rating should, in fact, have been higher – the financial situation not being as 
bad as what was reflected in the ratings. Issuers will thus have a double interest in finding 
CRAs liable for inaccurate ratings: financial losses and reputational damage.
120
  
Investors will suffer losses when the rating given was higher than an accurate assessment 
of the financial situation justified. A high rating will lead investors to think that the product 
and/or the issuer is profitable, and it will, therefore, lead them to invest more money than 
they should have.
121
 Claimants might also want to initiate proceedings against a CRA if there 
is a sudden downgrade of an issuer or a product issued, meaning that the rating should have 
been downgraded beforehand and the CRA did not react timeously. These two situations are 
examples of inaccurate ratings as they do not reflect reality accurately, or, in time. All these 
situations are damaging to investors as they may have paid more than they should have for 
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the financial product obtained. They may be left with smaller benefits than what they 
expected, or with no financial benefit at all if the issuer went into liquidation after the 
downgrade. 
Even though these inaccuracies can occur and result in losses for investors, they are not 
of themselves a source of civil liability.
 
Indeed, to take CRAs to court, investors need to 
prove more than a mis-match between the rating issued and the factual reality because this 
fact alone is not considered enough to constitute fault.
122
 Credit ratings are, in fact, an 
evaluation performed by the CRAs, not entirely a statement of facts but the result of a process 
conducted by the agencies. For this reason, a mismatch can occur. Indeed, “a multiplicity of 
uncertain factors influences the issuer's creditworthiness and these are not (always and/or to 
their fullest extent) foreseeable, even by a professional party such as a CRA.”123 Causation 
alone is insufficient. Fault, whether ordinary or gross, needs to be established. Otherwise, one 
fails to account for the fact that CRAs operate in a world of uncertainty in which judgments 
must be made. It is submitted that, we should avoid the danger of the hindsight judgments by 
courts particularly in negligence actions, which exaggerate the information available to CRAs 
based on the fuller picture that always emerges in the aftermath of an event. 
In a nutshell, an investor who bases her investment decision on an overly-positive credit 
rating, and suffers losses as a result of her investment decision could only take this credit 
rating as a basis for a civil liability lawsuit if it derives from blameworthy behaviour of the 
rating agency, according to the qualification given by each legal approach under scrutiny. 
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II. Overview of the bases of liability in each MS to be studied 
When an investor suffers a loss from a financial investment that she considers the 
consequence of an overly positive credit rating, she may have the choice between different 
jurisdictions where she can bring the lawsuit and if not, she will in any case ascertain which 
legal basis is suitable for her lawsuit. The overview of the different liability regimes applied 
to CRAs in the European Union provided here could help investors ascertain the feasibility of 
obtaining damages against CRAs.  
The choice of Germany, France and the United Kingdom was made on the basis of a 
twofold approach: first, these three Member States adopt different approaches with regard to 
the civil liability of CRAs since the 2008 financial crisis; second, they are representive of the 
main legal traditions that exist in Europe – Common Law and Civil Law. The purpose of this 
section is to give a broad overview of the various legal bases that could be used under each 
national law. I will start with the rules contained in the recent EU provision on CRAs’ civil 
liability and then study the legal bases in each Member State chosen, to see more clearly how 
this EU cause of action will fit into national systems. 
A. European Provision: Article 35a CRA Regulation 2009 
At the European level, the new Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies (CRA3) of June 
2013 provides a new basis of liability for CRAs. Concerned with the impossibility of 
financial actors to obtain the civil liability of CRAs, the European legislator decided to take 
measures facilitating the accountability of CRAs towards issuers and investors.
124
 The basis 
of competence used in this field by the EU is Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. 
The adoption of an amendment on CRAs liability did not follow an easy path. Its 
legislative development illustrates quite well the difficulties existing in this area as well as 
the different interests at stake. The amendment, that has now become Article 35a of the CRA 
Regulation 2009, was initially proposed by the European Commission, following a non-
legislative resolution of the European Parliament encouraging the Commission to render 
CRAs “accountable for the consistent application of the underlying methodology of their 
credit ratings. [Members] recommend therefore that CRAs’ exposure to civil liability in the 
event of gross negligence or misconduct be defined on a consistent basis across the EU and 
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that the Commission should identify ways for such civil liability to be anchored in Member 
States’ civil law.”125 The Commission’s proposal adopted on 15th March 2011126 was 
understood as introducing “a very strict liability rule”127, in the sense that it strongly 
facilitated investors’ ability to bring civil liability claims. 
One of the most problematic parts of the Commission’s proposal was paragraph 4, which 
introduced a reversal of the burden of proof: “[w]here an investor establishes facts from 
which it may be inferred that a credit rating agency has committed any of the infringements 
listed in Annex III, it will be for the credit rating agency to prove that it has not committed 
that infringement or that that infringement did not have an impact on the issued credit 
rating.”128 This reversal aimed at solving the factual impossibility for investors to 
demonstrate proof in their claims and, overall, at resolving the establishment of a causal link, 
which was one of the main hurdles encountered by investors. While greatly helping investors, 
this proposal was however controversial. As Haar rightly pinpoints “an investor will always 
find some questionable practice to exploit as an infringement, (and under the Draft Proposal 
the rating agencies would then have to carry the burden of proof to establish their 
innocence).”129 This one-sided approach was, therefore, severely criticized in the later 
legislative process. The Council of the European Union reflected these criticisms in its 
amendments
130
, which mainly alleviated the liability imposed to CRAs, compared to the 
Commission’s proposal.131 The amendments made are mainly a suppression of the reversal of 
the burden of proof, the introduction of a possibility of imposing limits on CRAs’ liability 
and the recognition of Member States’ leeway to interpret non-defined terms of the provision. 
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The liability framework was lightened to rebalance investor and CRA interests, but failed to 
resolve the main problems of the area such as proof and causation.
132
 
A stricter view, compared to that of the Council, was finally proposed by the Committee 
on Economic and Monetary Affairs in its report of 23 August 2012.
133
 Its report underlines 
that “the European Parliament and the Legal Affairs Committee in particular have favoured 
the inclusion of common civil liability rules for deliberate and negligent infringements of the 
rules of the EU Rating Regulation.”134 Not all amendments made by this Committee were 
introduced into the final regulation. After negotiations, the new Regulation on CRAs was 
finally adopted on 21 May 2013. 
The final version of the provision contains six paragraphs. The first states the main 
conditions of the liability, including the type of behaviour required – an infringement listed in 
Annex III committed intentionally or with gross negligence – and the kind of causal link – an 
impact of the infringement on the rating and a causal link between the infringement and 
investor’s damage. It also re uires investors to have relied ‘reasonably’ on credit ratings 
meaning either, in accordance with Article 5a(1), that they did “not solely or mechanistically 
rely on credit ratings for assessing the creditworthiness of an entity or financial 
instrument”135, or  that they used the credit ratings “with due care”. 
With regard to national laws, this new provision respects the particularities of each 
Member State by giving them leeway in the definition of terms such as the form of the 
wrongful behaviour (e.g. gross negligence) or other important parameters peculiar to the legal 
system in which it is applied, such as ‘damage’.136 Paragraph 5 of the provision also ensures 
that this new liability regime “does not exclude further civil liability claims in accordance 
with national law”.  
The disadvantage is that the new provision does not resolve the causation problem. As the 
issue of proof is finally not resolved, with it goes the problem of causation for investors, a 
problem that had disappeared in the initial proposal. However, the rapporteur of the 
Committee for Economic and Monetary Affairs disagrees “that it would be appropriate to 
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impose a reversed burden of proof on CRA to demonstrate their innocence when it comes to 
the issue of whether an infringement had an impact on the resulting rating.”137 
At this early stage of our analysis, we can already say that the new EU provision on 
CRAs’ liability did not resolve the issues relating to civil liability. Investors will still face 
hurdles when they try to establish fault or a causal link between the fault alleged and the 
damage occasioned. It will be even more difficult for them as they have to prove intentional 
or grossly negligent behaviours compared to mere negligence on which they could try to base 
their claim on the basis of national laws.  
The question that remains is how this new liability regime will be integrated into the 
existing liability regimes of the Member States. An analysis of each national legal basis in the 
next pages, will allow us to grasp the answer to this question. 
B. France 
French law is rooted in the Roman law tradition and is therefore part of the Civil Law 
tradition.
138
 Though its Civil code – the Code Napoléon – was written more than two 
centuries ago, it has lost neither its importance nor its elegance.
139
 In our context, this code 
constitutes the major piece of legislation containing the basic rules applied to contractual and 
extra-contractual relationships.
140
 Other significant pieces of legislation have been adopted 
across time and were also codified. In addition, decisions of high courts do not constitute 
precedent but are usually followed by lower courts, recorded because they interpret laws that 
are often written in general terms.
141
  
France was the first Member State to adopt specific liability rules for CRAs in 2010, laid 
down in Articles L.544-5 and following of the Code monétaire et financier
142
.  
"Article L.544-5: The credit rating agencies referred to in Article L. 544-4 shall assume 
liability in tort and liability for negligence towards their clients, and towards third parties, for 
the prejudicial consequences of any wilful misconduct or negligence committed by them in 
discharging the obligations laid down in the aforementioned Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 
of the European Parliament and the Council, of 16 September 2009.  
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Any agreement having the effect of submitting, in advance and exclusively, to the courts 
of a third-party State to the European Union a dispute relating to the provisions of the 
aforementioned Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and the Council, 
of 16 September 2009, which the French courts would have had jurisdiction to hear in the 
absence of such an agreement, shall be deemed null and void and unwritten. 
Article L.544-6: Any clause which seeks to exclude the liability of the credit rating 
agencies referred to in Article L. 544-4 shall be prohibited and deemed underwritten.” 
This special rule does not create a new kind of liability but specifies the application of the 
general rules provided by tort law.
143
 These rules, rooted in Article 1382 of the French Civil 
Code, require claimants to prove three elements: fault, damage, and a causal link between the 
two.
144
 This provision has to be read in combination with Article 1383 of the Civil Code: 
“Article 1382: Any act whatever of man, which causes damage to another, obliges the 
one by whose fault it occurred, to compensate it. 
Article 1383: Everyone is liable for the damage he causes not only by his intentional act, 
but also by his negligent conduct or by his imprudence.”145 
 
The French tort law is described as a general clause system because it “is based on the 
simple enough principle of reparation for any loss or injury resulting from fault”146, given 
that damage and causal link are demonstrated. Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Civil Code 
allow for liability based on fault – wilful misconduct or negligence (respectively ‘faute 
volontaire’ and ‘faute de négligence’).147 But these articles do not explain what faulty or 
negligent behaviour is. From the case-law and the literature, we learn that fault exists not 
only when there is a breach of a formal written legislation, but also when the defendant’s 
behaviour breaches the general norm of behaviour, which one cannot find in a legal written 
text but which is, in contrast, developed by the judiciary.
148
 The liability provided in EU 
provision as well as in the specific Article L.544-5 of the Code monétaire et financier are 
examples of tort liability based on breach of formal legislation. 
The innovation brought about by the specific French law of 2010 was to make possible 
lawsuits under French law for breach of the obligations imposed on CRAs in the first EU 
Regulation applied to CRAs (2009) and its Annexes. This spirit was later adopted by the 
                                                 
143
 Anne-Dominique Merville, 'La Responsabilité Civile, Pénale Et Administrative Des Agences De Notation', 
Revue de Droit bancaire et financier, 3 (2013), at p. 4, § 12. 
Tort law is commonly referred as “extra-contractual” law. I chose to use the term tort law for the three 
jurisdictions not to confuse the reader.  
144
 De Montesquiou, op. cit., at C. 1) c). 
145
 http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Traductions/en-English/Legifrance-translations (last accessed 21/05/2014). 
146
 Stathis Banakas, 'Liability for Incorrect Financial Information: Theory and Practice in a General Clause 
System and in a Protected Interests System', European Review of Private Law, 7 (1999), at p. 262. 
147Amandine Assaillit, ‘Les fondements de la responsabilité civile délictuelle’, http://www.transfert-
facility.fr/files/Articles%201382%20et%201386%20du%20Code%20Civil_Les_fondements_responsabilite_civ
ile_delictuelle.pdf last accessed on July 6 2014. 
148
 Jacques Ghestin, Les Conditions De La Responsabilité (3
rd
 edn.; Paris: L.G.D.J., 2006), at p. 374. 
  
 
26 
 
European legislator when Article 35a was adopted in the CRAs Regulation of 2013: as 
explained above, every breach of an obligation imposed by this Regulation and its Annexes, 
if it impacts the rating, constitutes new grounds for civil liability lawsuits in the Member 
States. However, French law goes further as it also prohibits contract terms limiting CRAs’ 
liability, rendering them unwritten
149
 and as the fault in French tort law does not require a 
particular level of negligence.
150
 
Specific concerns were raised in France with regard to the civil liability of CRAs. In 
2012, the French Senate published a report on the situation of CRAs’, to reflect about their 
lack of accountability and regulation.
151
 The few cases in which the CRAs’ liability could be 
obtained was a major issue.
152
 The problem in France is not the determination of the harm, 
because French law does not have problems with the recovery of economic losses; the 
hurdles still faced by investors are the proof of fault – even though the French general clause 
system allows for some flexibility – especially because the burden of proof lies on the 
claimant’s shoulders;153 and mainly the establishment of the causal link between damage and 
fault.
 154
 The extent of these hurdles is analysed in detail in the following chapter. 
C. Germany 
Like French law, German law belongs to the Roman legal tradition. In 1900, the German 
civil law was unified with the entry into force of the German Civil Code, Bürgerliches 
Geetzbuch (BGB), established earlier in 1896.
155
 This legal tradition is based on the adoption 
of written legal rules adopted both at the federal level and at the level of the Länders.
156
 
These are the formal sources of law and have to be distinguished from case-law which, by 
virtue of Montes uieu’s separation of powers theory, is only an ‘informal’ source of law. 
Indeed, even if there is no application of the rule of precedent in Germany, rulings made in 
similar cases by judges commanding respect are likely to be followed by other judges.
157
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Another important characteristic of this legal order is the status given to legal doctrine 
writing: scholarly opinion is so significant that it is often repeated in judgments.
158
 
The particularity of German law with respect to CRAs’ civil liability is that this specific 
situation remains governed by general liability rules
159
 implying that a lawsuit brought 
against CRAs can be grounded on any of three different doctrines: tort liability, contractual 
liability and quasi-contractual liability. Because tort law provisions have a narrow scope of 
application, the German judiciary and authors have developed contractual and quasi-
contractual mechanisms to overcome the hurdles raised by tort law. 
(i) Tort law 
With regard, first, to tort liability, it should be noted that “ ermany lacks a basis for 
extra-contractual liability in negligence for damage to assets.”160 Indeed, § 823 I BGB, the 
main German extra-contractual liability provision, cannot be used to recover pure economic 
loss caused by a negligent conduct
161
 and protects only breaches of absolute rights (such as 
property or honour). This provision could not, therefore, be applied in our case, since 
investors will suffer pure economic loss.  In this regard, § 823 II could be of some help as it 
allows recovery for pure economic loss; but only when there is some additional statute aimed 
at protecting the interests of the claimant.
162
 This implies that investors are able to prove a 
breach of a statute protecting them against their financial loss, which is complicated. The 
cause of action provided at the EU level could, however, take the form of a claim based on § 
823 II or at least on similar principles because, as Forschner notes, the Regulation aims at 
protecting the market but this provision especially aims at protecting individuals: investors 
and issuers.
163
 The degree of fault is however not the same as § 823 II and applies more 
generally to mere negligence.
164
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Another provision of the BGB could be applied but it re uires a high level of ‘fault’, § 
826 BGB: 
“A person who, in a manner contrary to public policy, intentionally inflicts damage on 
another person is liable to the other person to make compensation for the damage.”165 
Under this provision, five elements have to be proven for liability to be recognized: first, 
“intentional unethical conduct, also known as intentional infliction of damage contra bonos 
mores” (Tatbestandswidrigkeit); second, unlawfulness (Rechtwidrigkeit), which flows from 
the first condition; third, intention or gross negligence
166
, according to the wider 
interpretation given by the judiciary
167
 (Verschulden); fourth, causation (Kausalität) and fifth, 
damage (Schaden).
168
  
In this respect, two points need to be clarified. First, acting contra bonos mores in the 
current interpretation means acting “contrary to the existing economic and legal order or the 
ordre public” and also “contrary to ethical principles (Sittenwidrigkeit)”.169  Second, with 
respect to the Verschulden and especially to gross negligence, the German High Court has 
recognised that advice given by an expert knowing that it will potentially harm someone 
constitutes a case of gross negligence which triggers the application of § 826 BGB
170
; this 
conclusion should furthermore be applied in a situation like the one of rating firms where 
“the author of such a statement claimed particular competence for himself”.171 A particular 
advantage of this provision is that it allows the recovery of purely economic losses. It 
presents disadvantages, however, in terms of the causal link
172
 and limits investors’ chances 
to succeed as it requires high standard of proof. Therefore, its practical application seems 
restricted. The judicial definitions of intention or gross negligence could nevertheless be used 
by German Courts for infringements of the CRA3 Regulation. 
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(ii) Contract with protective effects towards third party  
Because of the limits of German tort law, courts and authors have had to find other ways 
to tackle issues of pure economic loss caused by negligence. This is the reason why two legal 
doctrines were created: the contract with protective effects towards third parties on the one 
hand, a contractual basis; and liability based on confidence on the other hand, a quasi-
contractual basis. 
Contractual liability is relevant for issuers but will not often concern investors; however, 
even without being in a contractual relationship with an agency, investors could obtain 
protection in certain cases on the basis of ‘contract with protective effects for the benefit of 
third parties’. 173 This German institution, Verträge mit Schutzwirkung für Dritter174 situated 
between contractual and tortious spheres, was created by German Courts from the 
combination of § 328 (1) & (2)
175
, § 311 (3) and § 241 (2) BGB and the principle of good 
faith, to offer to third parties legal protection stemming from a contract.
 176
 Under this theory, 
investors have a claim for damages for their economic loss “caused by [the obligor] breach of 
accessory fiduciary obligations” but would not be in a position to re uire the fulfilment of 
contractual obligations.
177
 In that sense, the privity of contract is protected. While the original 
case-law concerned only physical harm, the principle was later extended to many situations 
and became applicable to pure economic loss.
178
 
Four conditions are required for this institution to be applied: 
- Sufficient proximity between the third party and the performance (Leistungsnähe); 
- Sufficient proximity between the third party and the creditor (Gläubigernähe); 
- Recognisability of third parties (Erkennbarkeit); 
- Vulnerability of third parties (Schutzbedürftigkeit). 
Because of their similarities, these conditions will be analysed in comparison with the 
requirements of a duty of care in English law in the next part. For the moment, one has to 
note that this legal mechanism will only be applied in case of solicited ratings; the contractual 
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link between the rating agency and the issuer being the source of protection for the third 
party. 
The litigation can be depicted as follows: 
 
(iii) Liability based on confidence 
With regard to liability based on confidence, the point of view changes. It is no longer a 
matter of third party protection but of third party liability.
179
 This quasi-contractual liability 
called Vertrauenshaftung and also seen by several authors as a principle for a liability 
towards the general public (Haftung gegenüber dem allgemeinen Anlegerpublikum), is laid 
down in § 311 III 2 BGB:
180
  
‘Section 311 – Obligations created by legal transaction and obligations similar to legal 
transactions: (...)  
(3) An obligation with duties under section 241 (2)
181
 may also come into existence in 
relation to persons who are not themselves intended to be parties to the contract.  Such an 
obligation comes into existence in particular if the third party, by laying claim to being given 
a particularly high degree of trust, substantially influences the pre-contract negotiations or the 
entering into of the contract.’182  
 
This legal basis comes from a reform of the BGB that took place in 2002 aiming to 
reform culpa in contrahendo, grouped together different cases that were based on the 
combination of § 280, 282, 241 (2) BGB
183 and was inspired by doctrinal considerations.184 
Under this recent provision, a third party to a contract can incur liability if she inspired 
confidence in one of the pre-contractual parties and thereby influenced the negotiations or the 
conclusion of a contract.
185
 It applies, therefore, to experts.  
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The litigation can be depicted as follows: 
 
Several conditions are re uired to apply this particular concept: the ‘special position of 
trust’ (Sonderverbindung) including a decisive influence (erheblich beeinflussen), and the 
‘disappointment of confidence’ (Vertrauensenttäuschung).186 The third party, here the rating 
agency, must inspire confidence in the sense that investors trust their expertise, the reliability 
of their ratings
187
 and therefore act according to their ratings.
188
 Authors recognise that a 
special relation of trust exists between CRAs and investors, implying therefore the 
application of this legal institution.
189
 Because of their role as gatekeepers, CRAs can be seen 
as experts placed in this ‘special position of trust’, their ratings having a decisive influence on 
investors’ investment decisions. 
Here the interest of the issuer does not come into play.
190
 One can interpret § 311 (3) 
sentence 2 BGB as a provision that does not require any contractual link between the expert 
and the person who trusted him. This provision is therefore of great interest in case of 
unsolicited ratings, unlike the contract with protective effects towards third parties. 
It has to be underlined, however, that there is a doctrinal controversy on whether the 
contract with protective effects towards third parties or the liability based on confidence 
should prevail on the other in the case of CRAs’ civil liability. To my knowledge, the 
majority of authors are in favour of the contract with protective effects towards third 
parties.
191
 Until the German High Court decides this issue, I propose studying both 
mechanisms, to provide the widest view of investors’ possibilities under  erman law. 
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D. United Kingdom 
The fons et origo of the Common Law tradition, the legal system of the United Kingdom 
is constructed in a different way than German and French ones. The predominance of the rule 
of precedent implies that courts’ rulings have an erga omnes application and that their ratio 
decidendi have to be followed by lower courts in similar factual situations.
 192
  This fact-
driven approach is then one of the crucial distinctions between the Common Law and the 
code-based legal traditions.
193
 This particularity influences our interpretation of how English 
law construes CRAs civil liability. 
In the context of financial markets, examining the Common Law is necessary because 
London is one of the most important financial centres in the world. London has also this 
importance vis-à-vis rating firms, the ‘big three’ have important subsidiaries there.194  
It should also be pointed out that the UK’s position during the adoption process of the 
new European rule on CRAs’ civil liability was against the establishment of a civil liability 
regime for CRAs because, in their view, such liability would undermine the market 
participant’s incentives to behave in a more responsible way on capital markets.195 However, 
once the specific provision on CRAs’ civil liability was adopted, the UK quickly adopted 
regulations explaining the application of Article 35a of the CRA3 Regulation in its legal 
order and defining the interpretation of several terms contained in this article.
196
 
When one tries to determine the legal basis that investors could use for their claim in the 
UK, one can find two suggestions in the literature: the tort of negligence on the one hand; and 
the estoppel doctrine on the other. The estoppel doctrine, however, is not of much help in the 
case of investors because it can only be used “as a shield but not but a sword”197, even though 
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some authors plead for its use as a cause of action.
198
 This doctrine will not, therefore, be 
examined here.
199
 
As third parties to contracts between rating agencies and issuers, investors cannot rely on 
contractual basis to obtain damages from CRAs.
200
 The basis that seems suited for them is the 
‘generic tort’: negligence.201 To be applied, this legal institution requires the fulfilment of 
three conditions: first, the demonstration that the defendant has a duty of care towards the 
claimant; second, that the defendant breached this duty; third, that this breach damaged the 
claimant.
202
  
In this context, a duty of care then needs to be established. The proximity required for a 
duty of care can result from statutory legal requirements or be found on the basis of general 
Common Law principles.
203
 The existence of a duty of care for CRAs remains debated in the 
literature but could be interpreted as existing by taking inspiration from a recent Australian 
ruling that found a duty of care for CRAs. MacNeil writing in 2012 stated that “the liability 
of rating agencies for negligence is a matter that appears to be untested in the UK courts”204 
and, from my knowledge, this remains the case, which leaves the matter open. As stated 
before, the factual approach applied by common law courts leads the courts to be bound by 
stare decisis only when the facts are similar. In this particular situation, however, no ruling 
has been delivered by an English Court. Therefore, we will have to base our reflections on 
situations that are close to CRAs’, for instance, the case of the liability of auditors.205 
Moreover, a claim based on the EU Regulation will more than probably be analysed by 
courts in the light of principles applied to the tort of negligence because of the many 
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references to this tort in the Regulations on Credit Rating Agencies.
206
 The cause of action 
could in my opinion form the basis of a duty of care and determine its breach in requiring that 
a breach of an obligation stated in Annex III being demonstrated by the claimant; but the 
other elements of liability will be based on tort principles and especially principles applied in 
cases of negligence: for damage and causation for instance. The tort of deceit could also be 
partially considered for the establishment of the intentional or grossly negligent behaviour as 
deceit requires a level of fault that is higher than mere negligence. This will be considered in 
the next Chapter. 
The several criteria required for the establishment of a duty of care, its breach, the 
investors’ damage and the need of a causal link will be studied in detail in the next Chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
206
 The Credit Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) Regulations 2013 that came into force on 25th July 2013, 
especially Regulations 6 (“Reasonably relied”); 8 (“Caused”); 14 (“Investors: general approach to determining 
damages”). 
  
 
35 
 
Conclusion 
Investors who suffered pecuniary losses because they based their investment decision on 
a credit rating that turned out to be too high compared to the real creditworthiness of the 
issuer have several options in the EU. Since 2013, European Union law has offered them a 
specific legal basis in a Regulation to make CRAs liable in case of breach of the obligations 
imposed by the EU Regulation on CRAs. This provision cannot be used, however, without 
linking it to existing legal instruments provided by national law that has to be applied in a 
given case.  
In France, its application will probably take the path of tort law, in the line with the 
specific provision that the French legislator introduced in 2010 for breaches of the EU 
Regulation on CRAs. Tort law principles will also be applied in the UK, with some 
adaptations, as confirmed by the regulations adopted by the English legislator in July 2013. 
More uncertainty surrounds its application in Germany, where the application of tort law 
could also be relevant, possibly by a combination of § 823 II and § 826 BGB. 
With regard to independent national legal bases, the most flexible is, in my opinion, the 
general clause system of France. Even if the French situation seems to be the clearest out of 
the three Member States, the specific requirements for liability that will be studied in the next 
chapter render this general clause system less open. In the line of tortious liability, the tort of 
negligence for negligent misstatement offers a good solution in the UK, though its 
application to the specific liability of rating agencies towards investors does not avoid 
controversies. The most distinctive solutions can be found in German law, in which 
contractual and quasi-contractual mechanisms were developed by the judiciary and the 
literature to overcome limits raised by tort law. Controversies in the literature surround this 
area, but the majority of authors give precedence to the theory of contract with protective 
effects towards third parties over that of liability based on confidence.  
Within these three national legal regimes, the main differences to underline are the 
distinction between countries with codified law and the UK with a common law tradition. 
This first and obvious distinction greatly explains why mechanisms had to be found outside 
tort law in Germany, to comply with the strict letter of § 832 BGB. It also explains why 
interpretations of the French judiciary are of great importance to control the limits of its 
general clause system. Another striking difference between the systems analysed is the use of 
tort law in France and the UK, but the use of contractual mechanisms in Germany, in a 
situation in which no contractual bonds link investors and rating agencies. Similar 
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considerations can, however, be found in English law and German law, such as a restrictive 
view of claims for recovery of pure economic loss; whereas this consideration is absent in 
French law, as it will be underlined in the next chapter. The last distinction that has to be 
underlined here is the differences in the structure of claims for liability: in France three 
requirements have to be demonstrated (fault, damage and causal link); in Germany there are 
five requirements under tort law and with regard to (quasi-)contractual doctrines, prior 
requirements have to be fulfilled before the demonstration of a wrongful behaviour, damage 
and causal link. The latter situation is also what is applied in the UK where a duty of care has 
first to be established and then its breach, damage and causation. 
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CHAPTER III: DETERMINATION OF LIABILITY: THE DIFFERENT REQUIREMENTS 
Fulfilling the liability requirements is the next step after the determination of the 
appropriate cause of action. These requirements adopt peculiar forms, they sometimes consist 
of sub-requirements and they have sometimes different function under each national law. 
Despite differences that can often be important, I will group these requirements into three 
categories: ‘fault’, ‘causal link’ and ‘damage’. As stated previously, the European legal basis 
will only differ from national law with regard to the fault; causal link and damage are 
determined by national laws themselves.  
In this third chapter, I intend to compare the constitutive elements of the liability in each 
of the legal systems studied. This comparison will provide an overview of the positive and 
negative factors of each law and therefore help to emphasize areas that can be improved and 
how. Comparisons are, however, sometimes rendered difficult by differences, this echoing 
back to legal culture specific to each of these three Member States; but also policy 
considerations that exist in one Member State but not in another.
207
 The first requirement 
studied – blameworthy behaviour – illustrates well this issue because one can find policy 
considerations regarding the extent of the liability already addressed at this stage in English 
or German law, but less in French law. One can draw, however, insightful comparisons after 
having examined all of the requirements because, as we will notice during the following 
analysis, policy considerations concerning the extent of liability will be found at another 
stage in French law – in damage or causality, the second and third requirements herein 
examined. Finally, I will make references to the burden of proof for each requirement, 
because this procedural aspect has a significant impact on CRAs’ civil liability in practice. 
I. Fault 
 I start with the requirements of fault at national level for breach of the care required on 
the part of CRAs and end the analysis with breaches of statute such as the new European 
provision. It is preferable to start with the specific requirements of the United Kingdom, 
Germany and then France because the sub-requirements of fault decrease in this order: 
specific requirements exist in English law and in Germany prior to the breach of duty, which 
can be compared to the requirement of fault in France. The CRA3 Regulation, however, 
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unifies the requirements of fault by stating specific rules in case of infringement of this 
regulation.  
a. Establishment of fault on the basis of national laws for breach of a standard of 
care 
In the UK and in Germany, prior to the establishment of the fault itself, specific requirements 
have to be met such that the claim enters the scope of these legal mechanisms (i -iii). In this 
area, similar policy considerations are encountered such as the foreseeability of investors’ 
reliance by the rating agency, or the problem of indeterminate liability. These similar 
considerations are the reason why I will first canvass the situation in the UK – where the 
situation is still unclear – before comparing it to the German requirements. In addition, I will 
briefly explore a recent Australian case that supports a finding of CRA liability. After the 
presentation of these prior requirements, I will examine the standard of care that could be 
required from CRAs. 
(i) Establishment of a duty of care in English Law 
 
A duty of care in English law can be found in Common Law principles. In D v East, Lord 
Rodger described the importance of the concept of duty of care as follows:  
“[w]hile foreseeability and causation are necessary elements in any successful claim for 
damages based on negligence, they are not sufficient: in the contemplation of the law, the 
respondents are liable to the appellants only if the doctor owed them a duty of care. The 
concept of the duty of care was famously described, some seventy years ago, as ‘an 
unnecessary fifth wheel on the coach’, but it remains an integral part of the way the courts 
determine whether there is liability for negligence.”208  
Claims introduced by investors against CRAs on the basis of the tort of negligence will 
pursue recovery on the basis of their economic losses. As in Germany, claims for recovery of 
pure economic loss have a specific status in English law. Recovery for pure economic loss 
has been allowed by English courts only in exceptional circumstances.
209
 Moreover, such a 
claim implies that a duty of care is imposed on CRAs towards third parties. Since Donoghue 
v. Stevenson
210
, duties of care towards third parties have existed in English law. This case 
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imposed liability on “persons whom one ought reasonably to have contemplated as being 
affected”.211 Yet this case was limited to latent physical injuries. It was later extended to 
recovery for pure economic loss in Hedley Byrne v. Heller.
212
 This development was not 
difficult compared to the complexity surrounding the recognition of a duty of care towards 
third parties who relied on defective statements.
213
 Indeed, the case-law concerning the duty 
of care for negligent misrepresentation is less than clear.
214
 The conditions required to 
establish a duty of care for these claims differ in light of the circumstances of each case. The 
liability for negligent misstatements was applied to auditors in certain cases that are studied 
below. I will examine the extent to which cases involving auditors could be applied to CRAs, 
as no case involving CRAs has ever been decided by English courts. 
Candler v. Crane
215
 involved proceedings brought against an auditor for a defective 
report, in circumstances in which he knew that a person would make an investment on the 
basis of the report. It was the first case in which a strong statement was made in favour of a 
duty of care in these circumstances. The statement was, however, made by Denning MR in 
his minority judgment. The majority denied that the auditor had a duty of care towards the 
investor. Denning MR decided in favour of a duty of care owed by auditors “to all persons to 
whom the auditor knew the report would be presented,” rather than only towards their 
immediate clients, as was required by the law.
216
 
In time, MR Denning’s minority judgment became more convincing than the majority 
judgment because, in 1963, the House of Lords relied on it in Hedley Byrne v. Heller. This 
case is one of the landmarks of British tort law. The factual circumstances of Hedley Byrne 
differ from Candler’s case. In Hedley, the case involved a bank and not an auditor.217 It was a 
difficult case as the Court had to treat two problematic legal questions: negligent statements 
on the one hand, and pure economic loss on the other. Unlike in Candler, the Court in Hedley 
recognised, in principle, the existence of a duty of care towards third parties for negligent 
misstatement in cases of pure economic loss when a special relationship exists and, at the 
same time, it stated that the advisor can limit its liability by introducing a disclaimer.
218
 
                                                 
211
 Von Schweinitz, op. cit., at p. 130. 
212
 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. 
213
 Von Schweinitz, op. cit., at p. 130. 
214
 Ibid., at p. 132. 
215
 Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co, [1951] 2 KB 164 (CA). 
216
 Von Schweinitz, op. cit., at p. 133. 
217
 For details on facts of the case: Ibid., at p. 134; Charles Mitchell and Paul Mitchell, Landmark Cases in the 
Law of Tort (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2010), at p. 173-174. 
218
 Von Schweinitz, op. cit., at p. 135. The question of disclaimers is discussed at the end of this Chapter. 
  
 
40 
 
The question of whether sufficient proximity exists between the parties before the court is 
central to the recognition of a duty of care towards third parties for negligent misstatement.
219
 
This question of proximity was faced in Hedley Byrne, where the determination of a special 
relationship between claimant and defendant was discussed.
220
 Here the House of Lords 
stated three conditions to determine whether such a special relationship exists, this test being 
often referred to as the assumption of responsibility test: first, whether the person to whom 
the advice is addressed “would rely on the knowledge and abilities of the advisor”221; second, 
whether the person giving advice “knew or should have known that” the person receiving the 
advice would rely “on the accuracy of the advice”222; third, whether the person receiving the 
advice “could justifiably act in reliance on the advice” according to the facts of the case.223 
The House of Lords also underlined that “giving advice construed a ‘special relationship’ 
re uiring the duty of care of the advisor”.224  
We will now attempt to apply this test to CRAs. As in Hedley Byrne, the bank was in an 
expert position compared to the person receiving the advice; this case should be applicable to 
rating agencies, as they are also in a position of specific expertise compared to investors. 
225
 
Moreover, as von Schweinitz supports, “the term ‘advice’ [used in Hedley Byrne] does not 
necessarily imply that the advisor recommends or describes a particular investment with the 
intention of making it more attractive to the advisee”.226 According to this author, it can also 
be considered as an advice when a person makes a statement that inspires confidence, 
considering him/herself an expert in a specific field.  Because of the specific gatekeeper role 
that CRAs exert on financial markets, they know that third parties will rely on their 
statement.
227
 For the purpose of liability, only foreseeablity of the inducement by the advice 
is required, not the specific intent of causing the harm done.
228
 Moreover, investors will have 
to demonstrate that they reasonably relied on the rating. Given the importance of ratings in 
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financial markets with regard to the creditworthiness of financial products, it appears to me 
that it can be reasonable for investors to rely on credit ratings when they take their investment 
decisions; but the reasonableness test will depend upon the specific circumstances of each 
case (e.g. the expertise of the investor or the complexity of financial products). On the basis 
of these elements, I consider that the findings of Hedley Byrne can be applied to CRAs and 
lead to recognition of a duty of care imposed on CRAs towards investors. 
Following the evolution of the case-law
229
, the House of Lords developed a two-stage test 
in Anns v. Merton London Borough
230
 but later dismissed it
231
 and replaced it in Caparo 
Industries Plc. Respondents v. Dickman and other appellants
232
 with a three-stage test 
re uiring reasonable foreseeability of the claimant’s damage “as a result of the defendant’s 
negligence”233, sufficient proximity between the parties, and that imposing liability would be 
“fair, just and reasonable”.234 This case involved auditors’ liability for issuing a report on 
which the claimant, Caparo, relied on to make a takeover-bid of Fidelity, a company in which 
Caparo already owned shares but instead of making profits from this investment, Caparo 
incurred large losses
235
.  
Here judges had to face a crucial question: how far should this liability go? In claims for 
misleading statements there is a fear of indeterminate liability towards third parties.
236
 The 
scope of liability was the reason why the House of Lords dismissed Caparo’s action, fearing 
that it “would be to create a liability wholly indefinite in area, duration and amount and 
would open up a limitless vista of uninsurable risk for the professional man”.237  
In addition, Lord Oliver developed in this case a four-step analysis to ascertain the existence 
of the special relationship needed for a duty of care to arise, i.e. the sufficient proximity. The 
first element is the purpose of the advice. According to the House of Lords, the auditors’ 
report was not made to serve for investment decisions in a company but to allow the control 
of the board of this company.
238
 In the words of Lord Oliver, the purpose of the advice should 
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be “made known either actually of inferentially, to the adviser at the time when the advice is 
given”.239 The second criteria is that the adviser knows, “actually or inferentially,” when he 
makes the statement, to whom his statement will be communicated, these people being 
specific persons or members of an ascertainable class to which the ‘advice’ is 
communicated. Third, it must be likely that it will be acted on the advice given “without 
independent in uiry”; and, fourth, it is re uired that it was actually acted on the advice, to the 
claimant’s detriment.240 Similar considerations were also stated in Al Saudi Banque v. Pixley 
in which the House of Lords found that no duty of care was owed by creditors towards third 
parties according to two conditions given to limit the scope of such duty of care: “(i) to limit 
the transaction in which the defendant’s statement may be relied upon to the transaction in 
which he intended it, or knew it was intended, to be relied upon; and (ii) to limit the plaintiff 
or class of plaintiff to the person or persons to whom the defendant made the statement, or to 
whom he intended or knew that it was intended to be communicated.”241 
The conditions developed in Caparo and Al Saudi cannot be profitably applied to credit 
ratings because two conditions could be difficult to satisfy: the purpose condition and the 
condition of the class to which the advice is communicated. CRAs could argue that the 
purpose of ratings is only to assess the creditworthiness of a financial product and that the 
class of claimants could be too wide and, therefore, lead to indeterminate liability. Moreover, 
the determination of whether imposing liability on CRAs would be “fair, just and reasonable” 
will certainly be the most uncertain element of a court ruling; the application of the Caparo 
test would then probably lead to the non-imposition of a duty of care on CRAs. However, as 
von Schweinitz stresses, “rating actions do not generally have an internal purpose, but rather, 
are geared towards the reliance of the capital markets” and it could also be considered that 
the foreseeability of claimant’s damage and of the class of claimants are fulfilled as CRAs are 
aware that investors would rely upon the ratings issued for their investment decision.
242
 
Both Caparo and the assumption of responsibility tests were considered together by the 
House of Lords in The Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Barclays Bank plc.
243
 The 
House of Lords ruled that the bank did not owe a duty of care to the Customs and Excise 
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Commissioners.
244
 The ultimate decision in favour of Barclays Bank was based on the 
Caparo test, more specifically on the “fair, just and reasonable” condition, however, both the 
assumption of duty test as well as the incremental approach were considered.
245
 In a nutshell, 
as Roger notes, all three tests have “a role to play in suitable cases, perhaps in a mutually 
supportive way, for there are some signs of running the concepts together.”246 
To sum up, what conditions should we apply to determine whether CRAs owe a duty of 
care to investors? Certain authors are in favour of the application of the Caparo test to 
CRAs
247
; others are not and plead for a feasible establishment of a duty of care towards 
investors.
248
 In my opinion, and on the basis of the suggestion made by Rogers above, the 
assumption of responsibility test should be applied to CRAs but could be combined with 
considerations stated in Caparo; these considerations should, however, be given another 
understanding that the one used in Caparo. Indeed, even if auditors and CRAs are both 
gatekeepers, they are not identical. On the one hand, auditors are internal gatekeepers whose 
aim is to inform current shareholders, people who have already invested in companies. On 
the other hand, rating firms are external gatekeepers whose aim is to inform investors, in a 
very large scope, making therefore their investment decision with the necessary 
consideration. The purpose of their statement is different and the people to whom their 
statement is addressed also differs. I agree with Harry’s opinion according to which “it might 
be said to be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty on a party whose purpose is the 
provision of an independent opinion on the credit worthiness of an issuer, to ensure that those 
opinions are: (i) independent; and (ii) competently arrived at, particularly where it is known 
that its purpose is to assist in the marketing of products to investors. The position of the 
rating agency can, on this basis, be distinguished from the auditors of a company because an 
audit is for the company’s benefit, the purpose of which is the fulfilment of a statutory 
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requirement, rather than the provision of information to prospective purchasers of the 
company’s shares.”249  
A pertinent Australian case 
A recent Australian ruling about the imposition of a duty of care on CRAs towards 
investors could inspire foreign judges and especially English ones.
250
 In 2012, the Federal 
Court of Australia found a credit rating agency – Standard & Poor – liable for economic 
losses suffered by investors. In this case, Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government 
Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5)
251
, thirteen Local Councils of Australia brought a claim 
against the Local Government Financial Services (financial advisor), ABN Amro (investment 
bank), and Standard & Poor’s for breaching their statutory duties, as well as for negligence. 
All three were found liable for the economic losses suffered by the claimants. The claimants 
bought structured financial products
252
, which had received a triple A rating from Standard & 
Poor’s. At first instance, the Federal Court of Australia recognised that S&P owed a duty of 
care to investors because investors’ reliance was reasonably foreseeable as S&P knew that its 
rating would be used for investors’ investments decisions.253 This decision was confirmed by 
the Full Federal Court of Australia in June 2014, with the damages for all losses divided 
between the three defendants.
254
  
Three interesting aspects characterize this case: first, how the courts concluded that a duty 
of care existed; second, how the courts dealt with the question of potentially indeterminate 
class of claimants; and, third, the width of the standard of conduct imposed on CRAs. 
With regard to the establishment of a duty of care towards the councils and potential 
buyers, the Federal Court used similar factors as those used in the previously analysed 
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English cases.
255
 The court first looked at the aim pursued by the issuer when the rating 
contract was made, i.e. to entice investors to invest in the issuer’s product.256 It was then 
established that S&P knew that its rating would have been used for the purpose of investors’ 
investment decisions
257
; reasonable foreseeability of investors’ reliance on ratings was, 
therefore, demonstrated.
 258
 The court then went on to consider the claimants’ vulnerability. It 
was held that S&P owed a duty of care to vulnerable investors, that is “investors ...unable to 
assess the creditworthiness of the relevant financial products or to challenge the rating 
agency’s rating of the products.”259 
“In these circumstances the very nature of S&P’s business of assigning ratings to 
complex financial instruments such as the CPDO, where few if any investors other than 
financial institutions would have the resources to assess the validity of the rating, assumes and 
in a real way depends upon the vulnerability of the investors to the conse uences of S&P’s 
actions.”260 
The issue of a potentially indeterminate class of claimants was also considered by the 
courts. In any case, it should be noted that the facts at stake are peculiar because it was not a 
case of liability towards the wide general public but towards a small group of potential 
investors. The product had indeed been created by ABN Amro for a specific scope of 
investors.
261
 On appeal, the Full Federal Court went even further in upholding the assessment 
of the class made by the first judge and stated that it was sufficient for S&P to know the class 
and to identify it: 
“Liability was not indeterminate because S&P did not know the precise identity of the 
members of the class, the exact number of members in the class or the exact loss. S&P knew 
what it needed to know. It knew the characteristics of the class. S&P knew that a 
characteristic of the class (some might say a critical characteristic of the class) was that each 
was an investor in the Rembrandt notes and S&P also knew the foreseeable type of loss.  It is 
the nature of the loss, not the precise amount which is relevant.”262 
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As for the content of the duty of care imposed on S&P, the first ruling found that S&P 
owed a duty to investors to issue its ratings on a reasonable basis, since the rating agency 
knew that its rating would have been used by investors for the purpose of investment 
decisions. The Court then went on to consider that the “modelling inputs” used by S&P 
would not have been used by another agency in the same circumstances. As Harding-
Farrenberg and Donovan emphasize, a breach of that duty of care is not established by the 
proof of a possible alternative rating, but instead by the lack of reasonable basis for the rating 
compared to what another agency, with comparable skill in comparable circumstances would 
have done.
 263
 
This case was an influential one, whose consequences reach far beyond Australia.
264
 As 
Edwards writes “the finding by a common law court that, in issuing a financial product with a 
credit rating, the rating agency owed a duty of care to the end investor of such a wide scope is 
novel and controversial, and will be of great interest.”265 In particular, this case could inspire 
English judges to rule in favour of a duty of care, considering that the English model of 
compensation for economic losses is very similar to the Australian one.
266
 The question is 
whether a realistic transposition of the findings of this case into other legal systems is 
possible. Inspiration for European courts, especially English courts, could be drawn from the 
segregation of claimants according to their vulnerability in distinguishing between 
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. 
(ii) Parallels between English requirements for a duty of care and German 
requirements for (quasi-)contractual liability 
Similar requirements exist in German law both in the contract with protective effects 
towards third parties and in liability based on confidence. 
As stated earlier, the contract with protective effects towards third parties requires four 
conditions to be fulfilled: 
- Sufficient proximity between the third party and the performance (Leistungsnähe); 
- Sufficient proximity between the third party and the creditor (Gläubigernähe) 
- Recognisability of third parties (Erkennbarkeit) 
                                                 
263
 Harding-Farrenberg, op. cit., at p. 192. 
264
 Edwards, 'Liability for the Rating and Sale of Structured Credit Products: Australian Cases and Their (Much) 
Wider Implications'; Haar, op. cit., at p. 12. http://www.itbdigital.com/opinion/2013/09/04/australian-court-
ruling-could-have-serious-global-repercussions-for-credit-rating-agencies/ last accessed on 20/06/2014. 
265
 Edwards, 'Liability for the Rating and Sale of Structured Credit Products: Australian Cases and Their (Much) 
Wider Implications', at pp. 89-90. 
266
 Ibid., at p. 90. 
  
 
47 
 
- Vulnerability of third parties (Schutzbedürftigkeit) 
At first sight, a main difference with the English developments is the focus of the test: the 
relationship under scrutiny is that between the issuer and the investor; rather than the 
relationship between the investor and the rating agency. A sufficient proximity between the 
claimant/third party and the performance is required (Leistungsnähe). Even if ratings are 
requested by issuers with the aim of obtaining financing on financial markets,
267
 investors are 
linked to the performance because ratings constitute a basis of their investment decision.
268
 
Third parties are also exposed to the same risks as the issuer in case of failure of protection 
(Gefahrennähe) as they are also affected by the rating.
269
 Another condition is the proximity 
between third parties and the creditor (Gläubigernähe) meaning that the creditor intends to 
include the third party within the protective scope of the contract, on the basis of good 
faith.
270
 An interesting evolution of the case-law in this respect shows that German cases 
have evolved in the sense of loosening the second criterion by abandoning the requirement 
that “the creditor must be responsible for the third party for better or for worse: für ihr Wohl 
und Wehe”271 leading to determine only whether “the objective interests involved permit the 
inference that the parties [debtor/creditor] have [even] implicitly stipulated a duty of care 
towards third parties”.272 Establishing that kind of intent is however difficult and a special 
link between the creditor and third parties is now often presumed by German courts. In the 
context of experts’ opinions, the  erman High Court went further in considering that the 
interests of these two parties do not need to be identical anymore (Einbeziehungsinteresse 
condition)
273
: it relaxed the requirement of similarity of interests such that the institution of 
contract with protective effects towards third parties has been applied where creditor and 
third party had opposing interests.
274
 This relaxation of the requirement reduces, therefore, 
the difference with the English approach which does not focus on the relationship between 
issuers and investors. Here, issuers and investors have divergent interests regarding the level 
of the rating: issuers seek the highest grade whereas investors would prefer a lower one.
275
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Nevertheless, the aim of the rating is identical for both investors and issuers as it is to give 
investment information to the investors
276
 that reflects accurately the issuer’s situation.277  
Until this point, German authors unanimously consider that these conditions are met.
278
 
The two last conditions are more disputed. They recall concerns that also exist in English 
law. The recognisability of third parties (Erkennbarkeit) is indeed a sensitive issue. For many 
authors this condition is particularly difficult to meet because the class of claimants is very 
wide. For instance, the scope of investors is not limited to the primary sale of financial 
products but would also be extended to the secondary market.
279
 The risk is to open the 
‘floodgates’ too widely and create an incalculable liability for CRAs.280 This argument 
echoes the fear of indeterminate liability highlighted in Caparo. With regard to this criterion, 
the German case-law now requires that the category of people potentially harmed can be 
determined on the basis of objective standards
281
, though there is no need to know the exact 
identity of third parties or the number of third parties affected.
282
 The whole question is 
therefore what can be considered as ‘objective standards’: is it sufficient that CRAs can 
foresee investors’ reliance? According to von Schweiniz, it re uires that “[t]he debtor can 
recognize both the risks arising to the third party and the interests of the creditor to include 
this party.”283 In this view, the knowledge of the rating agency that the rating is meant to be 
used by investors suffices.
284
 The fulfilment of this criterion is, therefore, debated and will 
have to be decided by the judiciary. Inspiration could be drawn from the Australian case 
Bathurst in which the foreseeability of the class of claimants depended upon the 
characteristics of the class (investors in a specific financial product, with the foreseeability of 
the type of loss).
285
  
Finally, the need for protection (Schutzbedürftigkeit) has to be demonstrated. This last 
requirement is fulfilled when the third party does not have an alternate claim to recover 
damages: no claim based on tort law or quasi-contractual claim against the rating agency is 
obtaining. It is considered that no protection is needed when a claim against a financial 
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intermediary with the same purpose is at the disposal of the investor.
286
 The situation is 
different, however, if the claim is not equal, for instance if it is based on prospectus liability, 
where the purpose of the claim is different. In that case, a need for protection would exist.
287
 
This need for protection is assessed on the basis of good faith.
288
 
On the other hand, conditions required for the application of liability based on confidence 
have stronger parallels with the English assumption of responsibility test and focus on the 
relationship between the rating agency as an expert and investors, in the sense that the 
importance of the foreseeable and actual reliance on the statement is underlined in Hedley. 
First, the rating agency has to be in a ‘special position of trust’ (Sonderverbindung), 
requirement that clearly echoes back the condition of ‘reliance on the knowledge and 
abilities’ of the person who made the statement. There is no controversy here as to whether 
CRAs fulfil this requirement; their important influence on financial markets proves it. 
Second, a decisive influence (erheblich beeinflussen) is required.
289
 This requirement implies 
that the expert’s behaviour induces third parties to base their decision on the expert’s opinion, 
which is in fact the case for investors who base their investment decisions on credit ratings 
because CRAs claim particular trust for themselves. Reliance is therefore also important here 
as in the latter German institution with proximity to the performance or in English law with 
the foreseeable and actual reliance. Finally, the last condition is the disappointment of the 
trust the third party placed on the CRA (Vertrauensenttäuschung).
290
 It is, however, unclear 
whether this mechanism will be applied by German courts to CRAs. The new § 311 III 2 
BGB offers a good basis for this expert liability
291
, and parallels can be drawn with cases on 
appraisal experts, as, in case of solicited ratings, stronger links exist between the rating 
agency and the issuer. However, many authors do not expect German courts to use this 
mechanism for rating agencies, because even in the case of appraisal experts, the German 
High Court has continued to use the contract with protective effects towards third parties 
instead of taking this new path.
292
 
As it requires reliance, and position of trust, the quasi-contractual liability of expert in 
German law is close to the conditions developed in English law regarding the assumption of 
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responsibility; whereas one could consider the conditions applied for the contract with 
protective effects towards third parties closer to the conditions developed in Caparo: 
limitation of the scope of claimants via proximity requirements and fear of indeterminate 
liability. According to the criteria determined by Heukamp on the basis of civil liability for 
experts, an important criterion is the foreseeability by the expert of the use of its statement; 
the two other conditions developed being the specific and known competence of the person 
and that the statement was re uired “in order that it may be used vis-à-vis third parties”.293 I 
consider that these conditions could be met in the settings of the fact pattern followed here; 
but sensible conditions related to the limits of liability will depend on the specific 
circumstances of each case. 
(iii) Standard of care – breach of duty of care in English, German and French law 
The requirements stated above about the establishment of a duty of care and its parallels 
with the application of (quasi-) contractual liability in German law serve as a filter to limit 
the number of claimants allowed to bring a civil liability claim on these bases. The next step 
is to determine what breach of the duty of care is relevant and, therefore, what standard of 
care applied. It is important to recall here that French law does not contain such a distinction 
between the assessment of whether a duty of care exists and the content of this duty of care. 
Only one step exists in French law: the determination of the standard of care, applied in 
specific circumstances. This is the reason why discussion about the French system comes 
only at this stage. 
Let us have a closer look to fault in itself now (une faute, the breach of the standard of 
care, the breach of investors’ protected interests). All three national laws have set an 
objective standard to which the defendant’s behaviour has to be compared294: the behaviour 
that a reasonable man will in any case adopt. Peculiarities of the defendant will not be taken 
into account: his behaviour will not be compared to the way he usually conducts his affairs, 
but to the objective standard.
295
 This objective standard will however vary according to the 
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circumstances.
296
 The whole question is to determine in our context, what constitutes a 
prudent and reasonable rating agency. In France, the general norm of behaviour requires each 
person to behave in a prudent and diligent way, in all circumstances.
297
  The definition of this 
category is much imprinted with an extended power taken by the judiciary.
298
 As no case-law 
exists on this particular issue in any of the three jurisdictions, I attempt here to determine 
what could be this general norm of behaviour for CRAs. 
In English law, the  uestion is also “what, in the circumstances, the reasonable man 
would have foreseen.”299 This concept of foreseeability refers to an event that is at the same 
time imaginable and that implies “some reasonable prospect or expectation that it will 
arise”.300 Foreseeability depends also upon knowledge and experience of the reasonable man, 
it is not simple probability.
301
 It is even more the case when it comes to professionals like 
rating agencies. For professionals who hold themselves out “as having professional skill, the 
law expects [them] to show the amount of competence associated with the proper discharge 
of the duties of that profession ... and if [they fall] short of that and [injure] someone in 
conse uence, [they are] not behaving reasonably.”302 Therefore, as is underlined in French 
literature, a high degree of diligence is to be imposed on CRAs as they are considered as 
professional actors, knowing that their rating will have an impact.
 303
 This high standard is 
explained by the use of in abstracto concepts – the comparison with ‘prudente et diligente’ 
behaviour of other CRA in France – to determine whether there is a fault or not.304 On the 
basis of many elements detailed earlier, such as CRAs’ role as gatekeepers or the prominent 
influence of their ratings in financial relationships, I consider that CRAs should be view as 
professional actors, like other gatekeepers such as auditors or accountants.  
A professional standard behaviour will respect standards applied to the profession in 
question, including then rules of conduct.
 
Rules of the IOSCO Code of Conduct therefore be 
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the basis of standard of care here as these rules shape the way CRAs are expected to 
behave
305
 and constitute the roots of “standards of care and diligence usually expected from 
CRAs”.306 Rogers speaks of a “considerable deference” of English Courts to professional 
standards.
307
  Most of these rules have been integrated in the EU Regulation on CRAs; but 
not all of them. Merville rightly points out that the requirement of having a sufficient number 
of analysts (recommendation 1.9) is not included in the EU Regulation, but on the basis of 
the IOSCO Code, an insufficient number of analysts assigned could constitute fault if all the 
human resources needed were not devoted to the rating process in question.
308
 On the basis of 
these standards, one can expect a credit rating to be an objective, cautious and prospective 
result.
309
 The objectivity of the rating reflects the independent and unbiased rating process; 
the caution implies a communication of all necessary nuances and verifications of the 
information on which the rating is based; the prospective character implies the consideration 
of known and predictable future elements.
310
 Caution should also include the obligation to be 
fully informed and “to use this information in the most efficient way”.311 A conflict of 
interest between the rating agency and the issuer rated could in my opinion create serious 
doubts for a judge as to the objectivity of the rating, in case the proofs brought by claimants 
do not meet the standards for fault required by the EU Regulation. 
An error in the rating process would be the result of negligent behaviour or an 
‘incompétence’, meaning an act that another professional, in the same circumstances would 
not have committed because the normal methods of this profession would differ from the 
ones used by the defendant.
312
 It is true that rating firms issue ratings on the basis of their 
own peculiar rating process, implying that a different evaluation of the several elements taken 
into account could happen. Fault would be demonstrated, however, if the rating process 
exceeded its evaluative leeway.
313
 Behaviour which would not follow the professionalism 
required, for instance, by issuing a rating without all the due care required, e.g. without the 
procurement of all the relevant information, would be consider wrongful. In this respect, 
Leclerc draws inspiration from the case-law on contracts to provide information (contrat de 
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renseignement) which obliges the provider of information to “inform himself in order to 
inform in full awareness”.314  
French authors consider that the proof of such wrongful behaviour would be easier. First, 
when the rating awarded was very high, or the highest, but followed by a quick and strong 
downgrade; second, with regard to an investment grade rating that fell quickly into the 
speculative grade category.
315
 These situations would indicate fault. If the rating in question 
was awarding the highest grade, it means that the rating agency should have awarded it with 
all the care required. A quick downgrade of such high rating leads to the assumption that all 
the carefulness required was not given to the awarding of the highest grade.
316
 
In Germany, the standard of care required is established on the basis of the principle of 
good faith. In contrast to French and English law, thanks to the institution of contract with 
protective effects towards third parties, investors will be able the use of legal principles 
applied to contracts. Indeed, on the one hand, § 280 I (1) BGB presumes the existence of a 
negligent behaviour
317
 and, on the other hand, § 278 I (1) B B establishes “the imputation of 
an agent’s fault in the course of performance”.318 Investors will only have to demonstrate the 
existence of a contract between the CRA and the issuer (the source of its protection) and the 
inaccuracy of the rating, which constitutes a breach of the protection of his interests.
319
 The 
burden of proof is thus considerably lightened for claimants as they will only have to 
establish a contract involving the rating agency and the issuer as well as the inaccuracy of the 
rating.
320
 Once this is established, it will be for the rating agency to prove that it met the 
standard of care because, according to § 280 I (1) B B, the proof that the debtor “is not 
liable for the failure to comply with a duty always rests with him”. Finally, the liability based 
on confidence triggers the application of § 241 BGB that imposes an obligation “not to harm 
the ‘interests’ of others”.321 
A specific question arises however under German law about the defences that could be 
raised by rating agencies, as liability mainly takes place in a contractual framework. Indeed, § 
334 BGB provides contractual defences that parties can use against each other. Specifically, 
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rating firms could sustain that their rating was inaccurate because of wrong information 
provided by the issuer.
322
 It is recognised in the German literature that the use of these 
objections would be logical, since third parties are not supposed to have more rights than the 
actual party to the contract. However, this solution would lead to inequitable consequences 
for investors as their interests are not aligned with that of the issuer.
323
 Nevertheless, as 
Rosset argues, not applying this provision when the issuer was in fact responsible for the 
inaccuracy of information provided would be against the principle of good faith.
324
 
b. Establishment of fault for breach of statute 
Next to the breach of standard of care on the basis of the different national laws, the other 
option of investors is to claim breach of statute, especially breach of the new EU Regulation. 
To assess whether an investor could claim a fault of an agency based on the breach of a 
law under French law, it is required that the provision violated has an “imperative” 
characteristic,
325
 meaning that the contractual parties cannot set terms that are contrary, or 
that the behaviour breaches the right given by this legal provision.
326
 As we saw, in Germany, 
it is § 823 II BGB that provides a cause of action for breach of statute but only if it can be 
established that the particular statute protected the rights of the claimant. In English law, 
statute can be the source of a duty of care, whose breach is sanctioned under the tort of 
negligence. 
What are the relevant legal norms that apply to CRAs and that could base such a claim?  
First, it is to be noted that CRAs are excluded from the scope of the new Market in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)
327
 as ratings cannot be classified as investment 
advice because they do not implicitly or explicitly give recommendations to buy.
328
 Then, 
does the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) apply? This new regulation aims at ensuring 
investors’ protection and market integrity by prohibiting market abuses: insider dealing, 
unlawful disclosure of inside information and market manipulations.
329
 Under the former 
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regime of the implementing Directive on conflict of interests
330
, credit ratings again fell 
outside the definition of ‘financial recommendation’ for the purposes of this directive; rating 
firms were only invited to adopt internal measures insuring the disclosure of potential conflict 
of interests. That was an incentive of the Commission to push CRAs toward more 
transparency, before the adoption of the Regulation on CRAs themselves. The new MAR’s 
provision on insider information and market manipulation will, however, apply to CRAs 
because they can have access to inside information.
331
 The insider dealing and unlawful 
disclosure of inside information provisions apply both to the inside sources that issuers 
provide to CRAs and to the ratings themselves if for instance the rating firm had access to 
“non-public information of the issuer”332. Rating firms could also be subject to the provisions 
on market manipulation when they “knew, or ought to have known, that the credit rating was 
false or misleading”.333 It appears difficult, however, to make out a specific duty of care 
towards investors from this legislation in either the UK or in France. Nor will this legislation 
be of use in Germany because there is no right nor protected interest in this legislation that 
could be protected by German tort law provisions. 
What is left is only the obligations stated in the EU Regulation on CRAs. The Article 35a 
of the CRA3 Regulation states that the first condition for CRAs’ civil liability to arise is a 
breach of an obligation laid down in Annex III of the CRA Regulation. In sum, these 
obligations cover both procedural and substantial requirements, and insure the quality of 
ratings, transparency, that ratings are based on sufficient information or that CRAs take 
necessary measures to avoid conflicts of interest.
334
  For instance, CRAs should ensure that 
their “business interest does not impair the independence or accuracy of the credit rating 
activities.”335 An illustration would be the existence of a conflict of interest between the 
rating agency and the issuer rated: let us imagine that the analyst working on the elaboration 
of the credit rating had in fact worked for the issuer in some way before. That situation would 
amount to a breach of the Regulation. It is considered that the settings of the Australian case 
explained above could be an illustration of an infringement of the EU Regulation as the 
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ruling was based on the information and methodologies used by the rating agency, which 
would be punished under Article 35a of the Regulation.
336
 
The burden of proof of one of these infringements lies with the claimant, who will have to 
“present accurate and detailed information indicating that the credit rating agency has 
committed an infringement of this Regulation, and that that infringement had an impact on 
the credit rating issued.”337 It is not without difficulty for the claimant to prove the elements 
mentioned above, because they require, for instance, access to documents used by CRAs to 
make their ratings. These documents are often confidential because they are provided by the 
issuer to the rating agency directly.
338
  
This statutory cause of action requires that a breach of one of these obligations must have 
been committed “intentionally or with gross negligence.” The level of characterisation of the 
proscribed behaviour was not put at the lowest level, which reflects an idea of avoiding over-
deterrence. Requiring intentional or grossly negligent behaviour serves already as a filter to 
select the potential claims. However, even if the elements of the fault are determined at the 
European level, the notions of “fraud”, “gross negligence” are to be defined by the competent 
national judge on the basis of the pertinent national law. This definition can either open or 
close the possibility of recovery for investors.  
In the UK, the Credit Rating Agencies (Civil liability) Regulations 2013 provide 
definitions of which behaviour is qualified as intentional or reckless: 
“3.  In Article 35a, an infringement shall be considered to have been committed 
intentionally
339
 by the credit rating agency if the senior management of the credit rating 
agency acted deliberately to commit the infringement.  
4.  (1)  In Article 35a, an infringement shall be considered to have been committed with 
gross negligence
340
 if the senior management of the credit rating agency were reckless as to 
whether the infringement occurred.  
    (2) For the purposes of this regulation, the senior management of a credit rating 
agency are reckless if they act without caring whether an infringement occurs.” 
   
The tort of deceit could guide English courts in the interpretation of these provisions as 
“the tort of deceit re uires that the defendant knew of the falsity of his statement or was 
reckless as to its veracity. This must be coupled with a deliberate intention upon which to 
induce the claimant to rely.”341 It should be noted, however, that the rest of the provisions of 
                                                 
336
 For instance on the basis of Annex III Section I (42) or (43). Edwards, 'Cra 3 and the Liability of Rating 
Agencies: Inconsistent Messages from the Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies in Europe', at p. 188. 
337
 Article 35 (2) of the CRA3 Regulation. Emphasis added. 
338
 Thépot, op. cit., at p. 7. 
339
 Emphasis added. 
340
 Emphasis added. 
341
 Van dam, op. cit., p. 229. 
  
 
57 
 
the regulations adopted by the UK literally refers to the tort of negligence for the other 
elements of civil liability. 
The solution has still to be found in Germany and France, for France it is likely that 
negligence will suffice, in line with articles L. 544-5 and following of the Code monétaire et 
financier for infringements of the initial EU Regulation on CRAs and as Article 35 (5) states 
that “[t]his Article does not exclude further civil liability claims in accordance with national 
law.”342 It is highly unlikely that investors would base their claim in France on this EU 
provision, which requires a higher level of proof for the same breach that can be condemned 
on the basis of simple negligence, in virtue of the Code monétaire et financier. The 
Rapporteur during the adoption procedure of the specific French provision emphasised the 
possibility of fault when the breach of the EU obligations resulted from negligent or a non-
cautious behaviour.
343
 
In Germany, as we have seen, if we consider that this Regulation protects investors’ 
interests, § 823 II BGB should apply, but as this general provision only requires negligence, 
we can expect German Courts to apply the high level of behaviour required in the Regulation 
as a lex specialis.
344
 The interpretation given by the judiciary will determine which behaviour 
really corresponds to a fault committed “intentionally or with gross negligence”. If the 
judiciary applies similar reasoning to that developed under § 826 BGB – the provision 
requiring an intentional or grossly negligent action contra bona mores – then one can expect 
that the degree of fault required will be lower than what could have been expected. Indeed, 
the interpretation given by courts to this provision has widened its scope and allowed its 
application in case of dolus eventualis, “meaning that a person accepts the conse uences of 
his conduct as being inevitable even if he did not wish those consequences to occur. Hence, it 
is sufficient that the tortfeasor was aware of the possibility that the damage would occur.”345 
Courts’ interpretation also includes recklessness (Leichtfertigkeit) and applied it to auditors 
when the auditor was aware of the reckless character of his act
346
, knowing that the 
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information provided was of particular importance for a third party.
347
 Given the known 
impact that ratings have on financial markets, we consider that rating agencies are aware that 
damage can result from erroneous ratings because, in my opinion, CRAs know that investors 
rely on their ratings; but establishing that the rating agency knew its conduct was reckless is 
more difficult.
348
 
Finally, to succeed in their claim, investors will have to demonstrate that they have 
“reasonably relied, in accordance with Article 5a(1) or otherwise with due care, on a credit 
rating for a decision to invest into, hold onto or divest from a financial instrument covered by 
that credit rating.”349 These concepts were defined in the Regulations adopted by the UK, 
first as a reference to the test of reasonable reliance in negligence claims
350
, and second, as a 
reference to “the care a reasonably prudent investor would have exercised in the 
circumstances.”351 This requirement is a way of verifying that investors do not detrimentally 
rely on credit ratings. 
In sum, the choice of investor’s cause of action will mainly depend on evidence she has at 
her disposal. Thus, if she has detailed information on an infringement of the CRA Regulation, 
proving a gross negligence or a fraud on the part of the agency, this new provision will assist 
her claim. However, if she does not have detailed information or only evidence of negligent 
behaviour – except in France – it is more likely that her claim will be based directly on 
national liability regimes. In this latter case, additional hurdles to those in the EU Regulation 
will still exist, however, such as conditions limiting the liability according to the class of 
claimants. Uncertainties remain as to how judges will apply these conditions in the UK and in 
Germany, but also as to how judges will apply the requirements of the new EU provision. 
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II. Damage 
The following requirement is damage, dommage or Schaden. This requirement has a 
different importance in France and the other two Member States studied. Because strict 
conditions are not imposed in French law prior to the establishment of a duty of care, control 
mechanisms occur at the stage of the second and third liability requirements, damage and 
causal link. 
In each of the three legal traditions herein examined, damage is required for a liability 
claim to succeed.
352
 Even though damage covered by the EU Regulation
353
 is “any damage 
caused to investors”, damage suffered by investors will usually be economic. Indeed, their 
harm will consist of economic losses, losses of the money they invested in companies with 
high ratings at first and which were (strongly) downgraded afterwards, but also the loss of 
money they could have obtained if they had invested in another company or product. 
Economic loss is a concept that has a distinct legal meaning in several legal traditions to be 
studied. The meaning of ‘pure economic loss’ appears to be the same both in  erman and 
English law: damage not connected to physical injury, harm to property or other rights 
protected by law.
354
 As it has already been underlined above, this notion brings about policy 
questions as well as practical hurdles for investors because recovery of economic losses is 
more difficult under German and English law than the recovery of physical damage. Such a 
distinction and such a strong disinclination towards recovery does not find a place in French 
law.  
In Germany, the recovery of pure economic loss, called reiner Vermögensschaden, differs 
according to the legal basis chosen. Pure economic loss is recoverable under contract with 
protective effects towards third parties and liability based on confidence. The development of 
these two doctrines is indeed explained by the limits to the recovery of pure economic loss in 
German tort law. In the UK, since Hedley Byrne the House of Lords has applied the law of 
negligence towards third parties who suffered pure economic loss.
355
 Once the cause of 
action chosen authorises recovery for this specific kind of loss – after having put specific 
conditions for the use of that cause of action for instance in English law – the problem of the 
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nature of the loss is no longer problematic. In France, the scope of the definition of harm is 
very wide
356
 and the damage is governed by the principle of full recovery (restitutio in 
integrum).
357
 This principle applies to every kind of damage without distinction and implies a 
correspondence between the harm suffered and the recovery. Therefore, the distinction 
between pure economic loss and damages arising on the basis of physical injury does not 
matter much in French law, as the liability regime allows for “a recovery of everything or 
almost [everything]”.358  
With regard to the conditions required for damage
359
, the main condition that is similar in 
the three laws is that the harm suffered by the claimant has to be compensable.
360
 This 
condition will not be problematic for investors; it seems obvious that their damage is 
reparable, due to the economic nature of the damage. The demonstration by investors of the 
amount of their quantifiable monetary loss suffices in the UK
361
 and in Germany.
362
 
Other conditions are required in French law, which were inspired by articles of the Civil 
Code regarding contracts (1146-1155 C.c.) and further developed by the judiciary. The 
damage should be reparable, personal, certain, direct and legitimate.
363
 The condition of 
certainty implies that only harms that are ‘sure’ will be recovered. Hypothetical or eventual 
harms are not covered by civil liability. This is not the case here. Investors’ damage is the 
money they put into issuers in which they would not have invested without the rating in 
question. Second, the directness of the harm requires the harm to be an outcome of the act 
that caused it.
364
 It comes, in fact, only from the requirement of a causal link.
365
 In this 
respect, I refer to the developments regarding the causal link in French law in the next 
section. Third, the legitimate character of the harm aims to avoid recovery based on 
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illegitimate claims - for people in an illegal situation. The certain character of the damage 
should not be in question, nor should be the condition of legitimacy. In other words, these 
conditions will be fulfilled as long as a real harm done to the claimant is demonstrated, the 
quick downgrade of a rating alone is insufficient to show the certainty and directness of the 
loss.
366
 However, the last condition, the personal character of the damage could pose a 
problem for investors. According to Leclerc, to establish that personal damage, it does not 
suffice to invoke the harm caused to the financial market as this harm constitutes a damage of 
general interest and not damage specific to the individual investor.
367
 Next to the causation 
requirement, the conditions for recoverable damage are designed to control the limits of 
recovery in the French liability system, especially the requirement for personal damage that 
limits the number of claimants.
368
 
The recovery awarded will of course be in money.
369
 The amount of damages awarded 
differs from one legal system to another. In every situation, especially in German and French 
laws, the aim of the litigation will be to place the claimant in the same position had he not 
trusted the rating.
370
 French law does not take into account the gravity of the wrongful act to 
determine the amount of damages awarded.
371
 However, financial harm can be difficult to 
determine and judges can impose a fixed recovery when it is impossible to determine the 
required harm.
372
 In addition, investors could argue that they lost an opportunity to gain if 
they had invested their money in other products. This loss of chance is argued to be 
recoverable under French law according to French literature
373
, implying also a loosening of 
the causality requirements.
374
 I will however not expend more space on this subject here.  
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It seems, however, that a full recovery of losses incurred by investors will rarely be given 
by courts given the uncertainty of investors’ behaviour in absence of flawed rating.375 In 
addition, two ways exist to reduce the amount of damages awarded. On the one hand, on the 
basis of the new EU provision, CRAs can limit the amount of their liability towards investors, 
for the purpose of their civil liability for breach of CRA3 Regulation; on the other hand, 
contributory negligence may apply. 
The only relevant impact on damages of the CRA3 Regulation is the possibility given by 
paragraph 3 of the civil liability provision to rating agencies to limit the amount of damages 
they would give in a case of civil liability: 
“3. The civil liability of Credit Rating Agencies, as referred to in paragraph 1, shall only 
be limited in advance where that limitation is: 
(a) reasonable and proportionate; and 
(b) allowed by the applicable national law in accordance with paragraph 4. 
Any limitation that does not comply with the first subparagraph, or any exclusion of civil 
liability shall be deprived of any legal effect.” 
 
The reasonable and proportionate conditions leave the answer to the national judiciary as 
to what kind of clause will be allowed, as the interpretation of concepts of ‘reasonable’ and 
‘proportionate’ are the task of national courts.376 This new provision departs from the usual 
rule applicable to limitations of liability that allows limitations only when consented to by 
both parties or provided by statute since, as Wagner underlines, the rating agencies can 
determine the amount of damages that they are willing to pay.
377
 
On the other hand, a claimant’s own negligence can lead to a reduction of damages: in 
France such a device was developed by the judiciary (la faute de la victime); whereas in 
Germany and the UK statutes cover contributory negligence, respectively § 254 BGB 
(Mitverschulden) in Germany and the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945 in 
the UK.
378
 This is indeed a partial defence leading only to a reduction of damages and not to 
a dismissal of the action as was the case in the UK prior to the legislator’s intervention in 
1945.
379
 Contributory negligence is also a question of causality. A claimant’s behaviour will 
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imply a reduction of damages only if his damage was linked to his own negligent conduct.
380
 
For the application of contributory negligence, “[i]t is considered decisive whether the 
claimant behaved as could have been expected from a reasonable person in the given 
circumstances.”381 The standard of behaviour applied in this respect to the claimant is “the 
same as that of the ‘reasonable person’ in negligence liability generally.”382 The test applied 
under German law is laid out in § 276 BGB (Fahrlässigkeit). An objective test is also applied 
under French law but it has to be underlined that la faute de la victime can constitute a 
complete defence under French law, if the defendant manages to prove that “the victim's 
conduct was the only cause of the damage, which means that it must have been unforeseeable 
and unavoidable (imprévisible et irrésistible)”.383 In more concrete terms, Buckley recognises 
that English contributory negligence can be used in the context of negligent misstatement if 
the claimant can be blamed for failing to have searched for further advice.
384
 It can also be 
applied when the investor’s own credit assessment was flawed. 385 This defence is, however, 
difficult to establish. It recalls in a sense the requirement of reasonable reliance of investors 
in the EU Regulation, but these mechanisms do not have the same function.  
The use of this defence should be distinguished according to the kind of claimant: if the 
claimant is a small investor it will be more reasonable for her to rely solely on a credit rating 
to make her investment decision, but it would not be that reasonable for institutional 
investors, according to von Schweinitz, as they have access to much more information.
386
 
This will only be obviously the case when the rating is clearly flawed and that the 
institutional investor relied on it.
387
 The application of this defence and the extent to which it 
can be used will therefore depend upon the factual circumstances of each case. 
These two last mechanisms are important in the context of CRAs’ civil liability in order 
to keep this liability within equitable boundaries. 
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III. Causal link 
Each of the three legal systems examined requires a causal link between the losses 
suffered and the acts or omissions of the relevant CRA. Each Member State examined does 
not treat the causal link in an identical manner.
388
 A common feature is that in all three cases, 
the causal link is rather complicated to establish because the burden of proof lies on the 
claimant’s shoulders. Two causal links have to be demonstrated: one between the investor’s 
decision to invest and the rating; the other between the CRA’s blameworthy behaviour and 
the rating.
 389
 Concerning the second causal link, Article 35a of the CRA3 Regulation 
requires that the impact of the infringement on the credit rating be demonstrated. In the UK 
regulations concerning CRAs, it is considered that “an infringement has an impact on a credit 
rating if it results in a different rating category being assigned to the issuer or the financial 
instrument of the issuer to which the credit rating relates”390 whereas the term ‘caused’ 
referring to the fact that the infringement caused the investor’s damage refers to the test of 
causation applied in negligence “for the purposes of determining whether an infringement 
caused damage.”391 For France and Germany, I consider that the theories of causation 
developed for the relevant legal bases will be applied to these concepts. 
I will briefly expand the theories on causation in the three Member States to assess the 
concrete causation requirements afterwards. Diverse theories of causation exist in Europe. A 
distinction between two aspects of causation exists in Germany
392
 as well as in the UK
393
: the 
test that establishes liability (respectively haftungsbegründende Kausalität and factual 
causation); and the test that limits the extent of liability (respectively haftungsausfüllende 
Kausalität and legal causation or remoteness of damage). As regard to the first aspect, both 
German and English laws apply similar tests respectively called the conditio sine qua non or 
the “but-for” test. The “but-for” test394 refers as a cause to the wrongful act if the harm would 
not have happened if this act had not happened either
395: “but for the defendant’s act would 
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the damage have occurred?”396 The test is then based on a hypothetical inquiry.397 Therefore, 
it points as a cause to the act that was “a necessary condition for the occurrence of the 
injury”,398 echoing back to the conditio sine qua non test. To pass these tests, investors will 
have to demonstrate that ‘but for’ the credit rating, they would not have made their 
investment decision, which is already difficult to establish if other elements intervened in the 
decision. 
In German and English law the latter stage of causation refers to concepts of 
foreseeability or predictability of the harm. The theory of adequate causality in Germany 
(“adäquate Kausalität”)399 is based on an idea of ‘predictability’: a fact will be considered as 
having caused harm if, when it occurred, it could usually have been predicted that it will 
cause harm, on the basis of scientific data.
400
 The test of adequacy was established as follows 
by the German High Court
401
:  
“A circumstance is an ade uate condition of a conse uence where it has not 
inconsiderably increased the objective probability of a consequence of the type which 
occurred. Consideration shall be given to (a) all the circumstances of the case recognizable to 
the optimal observer and (b) any further circumstances known to the person creating the 
condition. The assessment is to be made in the light of the sum of all knowledge and 
experience available at the time of the assessment. This assessment of adequacy is not really a 
question of causality but rather the identification of the extent to which the person creating 
the condition can equitably be held liable
402
 for its results.”403 
In the main, what differentiates Germany from France and the UK is that effective 
certainty that the defendant's conduct caused some form of harm is required (§ 286 ZPO 
(Code of Civil Procedure)). 
In English law, the ‘legal cause’ also calls for a limitation of the indefinite causes that 
could exist.
 404
  To distinguish between the ‘legal’ causes and factual cause, the judiciary used 
the concept of remoteness, thereby implying that the defendant’s act should be sufficiently 
close to the harm.
405
 Close to the spirit of the German adequacy test, English judges use the 
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concept of foreseeability to determine if the cause is not too remote.
406
 Landmark cases in 
this area are the Re Polemis case (Court of Appeal 1921), the Wagon Mound Case (Privy 
Council 1961)
 407
; The Wagon Mound n°2 case (Privy Council): “[i]t is the type of harm, not 
the precise way it occurs nor yet its extent which has to be foreseeable.”408 The difficulty lies 
in the determination of “how narrowly the kind of damage in  uestion in any given case must 
be defined.”409 It appears, however, that the approach to foreseeability is rather broad because 
“[t]he defendant [in tort] will be liable for any type of damage which is reasonably 
foreseeable as liable to happen, even in the most unusual case, unless the risk is so small that 
a reasonable man would in the whole circumstances feel justified in neglecting it.”410  
The standard of proof re uired for causation is “proof on a balance of probabilities” in the 
UK, close to what is re uired by French law but far from  erman law: “when there are 
several possible causes of an injury, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s negligence is 
the most likely cause of his harm”.411 It is not a matter of certainty but of probability.412 
It has to be underlined that an interplay exists between the requirements for the existence 
of a duty of care and causation requirements in the UK. Causation issues are less likely to 
arise, as sufficient proximity between the parties is re uired “prior to the commission of the 
tort” for the establishment of a duty of care. 413 There might be a risk, therefore, that hurdles 
avoided at the earlier stage of the establishment of a duty of care would reappear at the stage 
of causation when using the EU cause of action.  
 The question of causation is treated differently in France, however, because two 
theories compete: the theory of adequate causality (théorie de la causalité adéquate)
414
 and 
the theory of equivalence of conditions (théorie de l’équivalence des conditions). According 
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to the latter, a lot of different elements can enter into play to create harm, all these elements 
being the “conditions” as long as they are indispensable to cause it. In this theory, the 
demonstration of only one of these conditions suffices to establish the causal link required.
415
 
The legal requirements developed during the time are a combination of both. Inspired by the 
principles of certainty and directness stated for causal requirements in the law of contracts 
(Article 1151 of the Civil Code
416
), the Cour de cassation determined the conditions required 
for the causal link.
417
 To be the cause of harm, the respondent’s action must be necessary to 
the occurrence of the harm, meaning that the act should be the conditio sine qua non of the 
harm: would the damage have occurred if the respondent’s action did not happen?418 A 
condition of ‘relativity’ can also be drawn from cases. Relativity is to be understood as an 
“intellectual relationship of correspondence”. In this sense, the illegality of the wrongful act 
cannot be without link to the harm, it has to be able to explain the causal sequence between 
the wrongful act and the harm done.
419
 Even if “the doubt benefits the respondent”, the 
re uired certainty is a ‘sufficient probability’; which is close to what is required by the 
Common Law and far from what exists in German law.
420
 
Once we look at the concrete causation in the case of CRAs’ civil liability towards 
investors, we see that several problems will be faced by investors when establishing 
causation. First, because the harm to the investor appears primarily caused by the failure of 
the financial product itself, investors will have to prove “that [they] had only undertaken the 
investment due to the too optimistic grading by the CRA”421; second, the fact that in most of 
cases they did not base their investment decision solely on the basis of a rating; third, even if 
investors manage to prove wrongful behaviour on the part of the rating agency, not every 
wrongful behaviour is liable to affect the rating issued. Merville takes the example of a 
breach of the obligation to rotate analysts: what are the consequences of this breach on the 
value of the rating issued?
422
 This nuance is also well illustrated by fault resulting from an 
insufficient number of analysts and that resulting from insufficient information gathered by 
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the agency.
423 
The link appears obvious in the second case whereas in the first, even if fault is 
recognised, the actually liability would be more difficult to demonstrate. Investors will then 
have to prove that the credit rating was impacted by the wrongful conduct of the agency, the 
infringement for instance in the case of conflicts of interests. If we follow the English 
interpretation it will then suffice to bring sufficient elements showing that the conflict of 
interest led the rating firm to award a credit rating of a higher category. 
The link will be more easily established under English law, because of the “proof on a 
balance of probabilities”. According to French authors, it appears that the demonstration of a 
causal link would be the other most difficult element in French law, after the demonstration 
of the wrongful act.
424
 According to Leclerc, the problem is that the Cour de Cassation gives 
priority to the théorie de la causalité adéquate over the théorie de l’équivalence des 
conditions. This tendency renders the establishment of a causal link more difficult because it 
would require that the sole reliance on the rating determined the investor to make its 
investment decision.
425
 The problem is that, usually, an investment decision will not be based 
solely on the rating, even if it is mainly based on it. Therefore, elements other than the rating 
will come into play in the investment decision, rendering the ‘exclusive’ causal link between 
the rating and the damage incurred because of the financial decision difficult to establish.  
Leclerc is of the opinion that the sole grade of the rating would probably not suffice to 
demonstrate the link between the wrongful act and the damage alleged. Many authors suggest 
thus to distinguish between small individual investors and institutional investors, implying 
that it would be easier for institutional investors to establish such causal link on the basis of 
their internal requirements, obliging them to buy or sell financial products according to their 
rating.
426
 
Finally, I put forward two suggestions to ease claimants’ task regarding this last 
requirement. First, inspiration could be drawn by courts from the presumption of causal link 
existing in German law in the case of prospectus liability.
427
 In civil cases, German courts 
have found that causation is presumed between the investment decision and the statement 
made in the prospectus,
428
 “if [investors] proved ‘an investment mood’ was created by the 
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prospectus.”429 German courts went even further in the field of liability for ad hoc disclosure 
by using the ‘fraud-on-the-market-theory’: the court presumed “relevance of information for 
securities prices in highly volatile markets”.430 A lot of German authors suggest applying 
similar mechanisms to the case of rating agencies in order to increase investor’s chances of 
success.
431
 
The second suggestion is to draw inspiration from the recent Australian case-law. In 
Bathurst, the AAA rating was not the sole element on which the councils based their 
decision, they also took into account L FS’s recommendation.432 The Australian court 
appeared flexible as to the issue of causation as it did not require that the rating was the sole 
cause of councils’ decision and, therefore, the councils’ losses. 
We should take the path of facilitating the proof of a causal link for investors because of 
the role of gatekeepers that CRAs play on the market and because of the great factual reliance 
brought about by this role. This was the path first taken by the EU legislator but this was later 
amended and finally the new EU provision does not help investors very much on the side of 
the burden of proof. 
 
  
                                                 
429
 Von Schweinitz, op. cit., at p. 181. 
430
 Haar, op. cit. (2013), at p. 6. 
431
 Forschner and Haar as cited above, but also Blaurock, op. cit., at p. 24. 
432
 [2012] FCA 1200 at [2458]. 
  
 
70 
 
IV. Obstacles to liability 
a. The impact of Freedom of Speech 
In the same line of reasoning, the extent to which the freedom of speech protection can 
impact the actual liability of CRAs is a significant question: does it create an obstacle to any 
civil liability lawsuit? 
This  uestion arises from the ‘quasi-impunity of CRAs’433 that was developed in the 
United States on the basis of the First Amendment protection.
434
 In this respect, the definition 
of a credit rating as an ‘opinion’, as underlined in the first part, has a significant role to 
play.
435
 Ratings are indeed opinions because they are “report(s) issued by the rating agency... 
based on its own standardized procedures.”436 To summarise437, this qualification as opinions 
allowed CRAs to claim the protection of the freedom of speech and to consequently obtain de 
facto ‘impunity/immunity’ because the US Courts raised the required liability standard to the 
level applied to journalists. Claimants had then to bring proof meeting the actual malice 
standard.
438
 This situation lasted until 2009 when US courts became more circumspect
439
, a 
tendency reinforced in 2010 when the Dodd-Frank Act
440
 reformed US civil liability to 
facilitate lawsuits brought against CRAs. 
In Europe, the question of freedom of speech has to be examined in light of both national 
constitutions and Article 10 ECHR.
441
 This latter provision includes ratings in its scope of 
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protection.
442
 Here, however, the freedom of speech provisions do not have the same impact 
as in the US: they do not render rating agencies immune and they do not imply a change in 
the standard of liability to be applied.
443
 Two main arguments can be made in the sense of 
limiting the impact of the freedom of speech on CRAs’ civil liability. 
On the one hand, the definition of a credit rating also has a role to play in Europe but in a 
different way. Credit ratings are defined as opinions, both in legislation and on CRA 
websites. Therefore, they have to be protected by the free speech provisions as they are 
subjective statements. Even if this view reflected the reality at the origins of the rating 
industry, legal scholars consider nowadays that credit ratings are not anymore solely 
subjective statements.
444
 Ratings are based on factual elements (companies’ accounts, 
fulfilment of their legal obligations, etc.), they are sometimes accompanied by facts when 
they are published in the context of a broader report, and can be considered at some point 
themselves as statement of facts.
445
 Indeed, according to Maréchal & Razafindrakoto, credit 
ratings can be qualified as financial information
446
 because of their significant role for 
financial markets.
447
 This implies that the qualification of credit ratings in fact changed 
according to the reliance underlined in the first chapter leading them to become objective 
statements, statements of facts. We can therefore conclude that, as ratings are both subjective 
statements and statement of facts
448
, even if the freedom of speech could protect their 
subjective aspect, it could not in any event protect the entire rating especially its financial 
information aspect. This is especially true when one thinks that liability claims will criticize 
questionable behaviour of the rating agency in the rating process which impacted the rating. 
The result-rating will then not be the sole basis of investors’ claim. 
On the other hand, Article 10(2) ECHR clearly allows for restrictions if they are set in 
laws and pursue a legitimate interest. The civil liability rules of each country to be studied 
can be considered as laws in the sense of Article 10(2) ECHR and they aim at fulfilling a 
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legitimate interest: “the protection of the reputation of others.”449 This reasoning can also be 
applied to other Constitutional provisions, as Oellinger clearly states in relation to the 
German Constitution.
450
 For these reasons, the freedom of speech provision of the ECHR 
cannot be construed in the same way as its American equivalent but rather forms a safe 
harbour protecting CRAs as long as they do not infringe civil liability rules. 
From all this, I consider that freedom of speech is an unavoidable issue in the context of 
CRAs’ civil liability, but that its function is not to immunize CRAs against any lawsuit, it is 
to make sure that the proceedings are based on inaccurate ratings that could validly serve as 
liability bases. In this sense, it justifies the margin of discretion given to CRAs within which 
they will conduct their own rating processes. 
b. The power of disclaimers 
A defence that could be raised by CRAs is the disclaimer of responsibility they display on 
their website, such as: “Fitch IBCA Ltd. has used due care in the preparation of this 
document. Our information has been obtained from sources we consider to be reliable but its 
accuracy or completeness is not guaranteed. Fitch IBCA Ltd. shall owe no liability 
whatsoever to any person for any loss or damage caused by or resulting from any error in 
such information.”451 The legal approach to the question of ex ante disclaimers is even more 
important in the context of claims brought by third parties.
452
 
Such disclaimers issued by CRAs on their website will not immunise CRAs in French 
law.
453
 Indeed, according to the case-law of the Cour de Cassation
454
, such contractual clause 
is null and void in respect to tort liability because of the public policy character of articles 
1382 & 1383 of the Civil Code. A similar situation exists in Germany where disclaimers will 
probably be disallowed on the basis of good faith because the Credit Rating Agency knew 
that its rating would be used to induce third parties to take their investment decision, in the 
light of what the Supreme Federal Court decided in a case involving a contract with 
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protective effects towards third parties.
455
 Moreover, such a disclaimer creates an exclusion 
of liability for deficient performance of a credit rating, which is counter to the primary 
obligation in the contract with issuers. In Germany, “exclusion of liability for defective 
performance of primary obligations” is contrary to the law.456 
The situation is less certain in the UK. In the UK, the impact of disclaimers is regulated 
by the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977, which provides that disclaimers have to be 
reasonable
457
 and adequate
458
 to be valid.  To assess the reasonableness of the disclaimer, the 
Court will take all the circumstances into account, especially the knowledge of the defendant 
that the claimant would have relied on his statement, or the insurance of the liability risk.
459
 It 
will be the defendant’s task to prove that this re uirement was met.460 It appears from the 
case-law that dismissal of disclaimers is more likely when the third party is in a consumer 
position than in a professional position.
461
 Reproducing such a distinction in respect of credit 
ratings – between small investors and institutional investors – would not be adequate 
according to von Schweinitz. This author is of the opinion that this distinction is not 
defensible in this situation, for two reasons. First, when CRAs make their disclaimer, they 
disclose it with the rating to the general public and cannot reasonably know who – between 
small investors and institutional investors – is going to obtain this information. Second, 
disallowing disclaimers only for institutional investors would not reflect the reality on 
financial markets, as institutional investors are more likely to have a quicker access to credit 
ratings than small investors.
 462
 
Disclaimers in Bathurst, an Australian judgment, were ineffective because of the way 
they were communicated to the claimants. The other argument was that S&P mainly intended 
to avoid investors’ reliance where it was in fact paid to issue the rating for the purpose of 
informing potential investors.
463
 This judgment is a good example of von Schweinitz 
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argument according to which “[i]f an expert makes an opinion knowing of the reliance he 
will thereby induce, he should not be allowed to act contradictorily by allowing such 
inducement and waiving all responsibility for the statement.”464 
Finally, with respect to infringements of obligations imposed by the EU Regulation, the 
Regulation
465
 as well as the specific provision under French law
466
 renders exclusionary 
clauses null and void.  
Once again, we notice a marked difference between the three legal systems, a difference 
that could influence investors’ decision to bring their claim in one of the three Member 
States, if they have this option under private international law rules. This situation is an 
additional source of legal uncertainty in the UK, because even if investors succeed in proving 
the existence of a duty of care and causation  on the basis of negligence misstatement, courts 
could consider the disclaimers valid. This was, in fact, the legal outcome in the landmark 
Hedley Byrne judgment. 
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Conclusion 
In sum, we can observe important differences in the way national laws deal with the 
question of civil liability of CRAs, but also parallels in the standard of care imposed or the 
use of contributory negligence mechanisms. 
Many uncertainties still exist as how national courts of these three Member States will 
react to a civil liability lawsuit opposing investors and CRAs. In the UK, the issue will 
mainly depend on the test that courts will use to establish a duty of care. In Germany, similar 
uncertainties exist as to whether the recognisability of the claimants will be met, but also 
whether sufficient causality will be demonstrated by claimants. In France, the proof of a fault 
is considered to be difficult, but even if the fault is demonstrated, the required certain and 
direct causal link will be the main challenge. For the application of the EU provision, the 
high level of fault together with the required proof of detailed information on the 
infringement as well as the poorly developed causal link allows me to consider that the actual 
application of this provision will be unsuccessful. The causal link, because its requirements 
are not made explicit, means, in effect, it rests with national courts to determine its 
requirements. This means that the law is not fully harmonised, and that focus on national law 
is justified because it is in the application of the conditions in national law that we will find 
the true extent of the scope of the new regulation. 
We can say, therefore, that the main obstacles to recovery faced by investors do not take 
place at the same stage in the different laws here studied. Problems are even different 
according to the national law applied because of policy considerations lying behind these 
laws. Let me summarize three considerations that appeared throughout this analysis of 
national laws. First, the problem of recovery of pure economic loss: this constitutes a central 
problem in our area in English law as well as in German law. On the German side, the 
restricted recovery of pure economic loss, available in our case only on the basis of § 826 
BGB, obliges claimants to find a cause of action somewhere else, in contractual or quasi-
contractual contexts. On the English side, cases involving pure economic loss require stricter 
criteria for the establishment of a duty of care. Second, the floodgate argument is dealt with 
in Germany and in the UK respectively through conditions of liability based on confidence or 
contract with protective effects towards third parties, and the conditions for the establishment 
of a duty of care, whereas, in France, this is done through the development of detailed 
liability requirements such as damage and causal link. This latter point well explains why the 
proof of a valid causal link under French law is a central question for investors. Third, the 
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relationship on which the focus is placed to determine whether liability arises is not the same 
everywhere. English and French laws focus on the relationship between investors and the 
rating agency. This is also the case in Germany when liability based on confidence is applied, 
but the majority of German authors prefer the application of contract with protective effects 
towards third parties, which initially focused on the relationship between investors and the 
issuer. However, given the evolution of case-law on the condition of proximity between 
creditor and third parties in the latter institution, we consider that the actual requirement 
appears closer to an analysis of the relationship between the rating agency and investors. In 
sum, we observe important differences in the way the three national laws examined deal with 
the question of civil liability of CRAs, but also parallels in the standard of care imposed and 
the use of contributory negligence mechanisms. 
.  
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CHAPTER IV : OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Imposing liability on Credit Rating Agencies was one of the tools brought forward after 
the financial crises to make CRAs aware of their obligations. Civil liability can deter 
breaches of CRAs’ obligations or codes of conduct, but also can punish CRAs, for non-
compliance. These functions require a difficult balancing act, as there is always the risk of 
creating a civil liability regime that is under-deterrent or over-deterrent. At the end of this 
analysis, I still have two questions I want to discuss: first, what are the limitations that could 
render this liability more realistic?  Second, is a civil liability regime realistic, even with the 
procedural rules provided by EU law? 
I. Answers proposed to limit the fears of indeterminate and unlimited liability 
In the final analysis, the whole question is to determine where the limits to liability 
should be placed. To engender a positive impact on CRAs’ behaviour, civil liability 
provisions should not be under-deterrent. This is the reason why courts should facilitate 
investors’ claim for damages by lowering re uirements for causation for instance467, but they 
should also take into account the specific circumstances of each case and apply when 
necessary corrective mechanisms such as contributory negligence. This will help courts guard 
against over-deterrence. In addition, suggestions can be made to provide answers to the 
unlimited liability and the floodgate problems. 
With regard to the limits of liability in terms of damages, it is clear that if CRAs’ civil 
liability appears to be realistic, litigation costs will increase for CRAs but there will be “a 
danger that the insolvency risk is shifted to the rating agency.”468 Indeed, one should not 
forget that the exemplary fact pattern used here concerns investors relying on credit ratings 
without paying for it.
469
 As noted earlier, CRAs could try to limit the amount of damages 
paid by using defences such as contributory negligence, or limitation clauses within the limits 
of the new EU provision.  
A question that courts will probably have to answer is whether liability caps should be 
introduced here.
470
 This question will most probably have to be answered when national 
courts will have to decide civil liability cases directly based on national laws and less 
                                                 
467
 Cf above, the extreme suggestion being the use of the fraud-on-the-market-theory, which should be used only 
within reasonable boundaries: Haar, op. cit. (2013), at p. 20. 
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469
 Ibid. 
470
 Ibid. 
  
 
78 
 
probably on an infringement of the CRA3 Regulation. The whole interest of liability caps is 
indeed to limit the damages paid by rating firms when they face a lawsuit that can have an 
over-deterrent effect, mostly a lawsuit for mere negligence, which is already less the case of 
lawsuits for intentional or grossly negligent behaviour. A first cap could be the limitation of 
damages to losses incurred in the primary market. A distinction could indeed be drawn 
between transactions on the primary and the secondary market, because authors consider that 
there is redistribution at the level of the secondary market.
471
 According to Haar, this first cap 
would not be practical, however, because it would imply a collective claim “by the 
investment community”.472 The liability cap that could be the most suitable is a cap based on 
the fee rating firms received for the rating issued,
473
 possibly multiplied by a certain factor to 
increase deterrence, if needed.
474
 This could be a good solution because if CRAs are obliged 
to pay the full value of investor’s investment, it could lead to over-deterrence, at least in 
cases of simple negligence. The last cap
475
 that could be used by courts, and which could be 
applied both in case of solicited and unsolicited ratings is a limitation based on “the 
difference between the value the CRA attributed to the investment and the true value of that 
investment”, a cap which was applied in the UK in Banque Bruxelles Lambert v Eagle 
Star (SAAMCo).
476
 Whatever is used by courts to set a cap on damages, “[t]he agency will 
have an incentive to invest in care as long as such precautions cost less than the expected 
liability towards third parties.”477 
The amount of damages should be proportionate with the degree of fault involved. In 
principle, the greater the degree of fault, the greater the sum of damages that should be 
awarded should hold. In this sense, liability caps should be relaxed in cases of gross 
negligence or intentional behaviour, and more strictly applied in cases of ordinary 
                                                 
471
 Ibid., at p. 19. “In these latter cases, the financial loss of the ac uirer is compensated by the gain in the 
security price of the seller, so that the damage can be looked at as a matter of redistribution rather than an actual 
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472
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negligence.
478
 These considerations should have been introduced, but were not, in the new 
EU provision. 
As to the size of the class of claimants, the factual circumstances will be relevant as 
sometimes the financial product is thought only for a specific and limited class of claimants. 
Moreover, distinctions will probably appear between small investors and institutional 
investors, given the difference in terms of experience that exists between the two types. We 
see this distinction gaining ground in Australia already, and I submit that it is a sensible one. 
Finally, the last parameter I would like to insist on is a possible distinction between 
solicited ratings and unsolicited ratings. Indeed, effects that solicited ratings have on markets 
can be considered to be greater than unsolicited ratings because solicited ratings are mainly 
based on information not available to investors leading, therefore, to greater attention given 
to it by investors.
479
 Courts should take this parameter into account when they have to decide 
cases. 
II. CRAs’ civil liability in Europe, a realistic claim for investors? 
We consider the recent EU provision on CRAs’ civil liability as a good step forward on 
the issue. The amendments made to this provision went too far, in my opinion. It is true that 
the high degree of fault required by the recent EU provision aims at avoiding over-deterrence, 
but as we saw, it does not assist investors very much. The upshot is that legal hurdles that 
were supposed to be erased for investors are still present: the burden of proof for fault is not 
reversed, leading to difficulties for claimants to prove it without the necessary documents, the 
causal link remains as well difficult to prove. True, this new provision has the advantage of 
giving a clear cause of action to investors when an obligation of the EU Regulation is 
breached, but the way it will be implemented at Member State level can also be a source of 
uncertainty and of forum shopping. It is clear to me that French, German, or English courts 
will not react in the same way to this kind of claim, given their different cultures and the 
different policy considerations that vex them.  
The contribution of investors to the regulation of CRAs in the EU remains quite limited 
for the time being. This situation may change if certain requirements are interpreted in a 
lenient way by courts in the EU. 
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The outcome of a civil liability lawsuit brought by investors against CRAs remains 
uncertain and will depend a lot on the facts of the case. If claimants can prove that the rating 
agency breached one of its obligations imposed by the CRA Regulation intentionally or with 
gross negligence, the cause of action based on Article 35(a) will prevail. Otherwise, they 
could try to base their claim on national provisions for ordinary negligence, tort or contract 
law according to the Member State chosen. Both exercises will however be difficult. 
Several elements should, therefore, be taken into account in the future when courts or 
legislators will deal with the civil liability of rating agencies. First, I consider that the 
vulnerability of the claimant/investor should play a role. As I detailed earlier, the 
vulnerability of investors was taken into account by Australian courts when they decided that 
investors could not by themselves evaluate the creditworthiness of financial products. 
Vulnerability could be part of the analysis of “reasonable reliance” as re uired by the EU 
provision. This consideration may also be a way to resolve the problem of indeterminacy, to 
reduce the potential claimants only to those who are vulnerable.   
Because of the wide diversity of civil liability regimes in Member States, the aim of the 
EU Regulation is undermined. The divergent approaches, not only between Common Law 
and Civil Law systems, but also within the Civil Law tradition lead to a different 
implementation of the EU provision and will also most probably lead to different rulings 
according to the sensitivity of national judges to policy issues in this context. 
The other side of the floodgate problem is the risk of providing no remedy at all. The best 
answer, as Von Schweinitz suggests, is to avoid closing the gate at the duty stage as in 
English or German law, but rather to establish a standard of care that would be adequate for 
Credit Rating Agencies.
480
 
To conclude, the CRA3 Regulation is disappointing as it simple leaves the question of 
determination of liability on Member State’s shoulders. Investors should, therefore, seek 
solutions at Member State’s level both for the application of this provision and for remedy in 
case of ordinary negligence, which the CRA3 Regulation does not cover. Legal uncertainty 
thus defines this area but adequate measures could be taken in the future based on 
comparative law and full harmonisation, to reduce this legal uncertainty and avoid 
uncertainty for investors on financial markets. 
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